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ESSAY
TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STEPHANOS BIBAS*
A great gulf divides insiders and outsiders in the criminal justice system. The
insiders who run the criminal justice system-judges, police, and especially prose-
cutors-have information, power, and self-interests that greatly influence the crim-
inal justice system's process and outcomes. Outsiders-crime victims, bystanders,
and most of the general public-find the system frustratingly opaque, insular, and
unconcerned with proper retribution. As a result of this gulf, a spiral ensues:
Insiders twist rules as they see fit, outsiders try to constrain them through new rules,
and insiders find ways to evade or manipulate the new rules. The gulf between
insiders and outsiders undercuts the instrumental, moral, and expressive efficacy of
criminal procedure in serving the criminal law's substantive goals. The gulf clouds
the law's deterrent and expressive messages, as well as its efficacy in healing victims;
it impairs trust in and the legitimacy of the law; it provokes increasingly draconian
reactions by outsiders; and it hinders public monitoring of agency costs. The most
promising solutions are to inform crime victims and other affected locals better and
to give them larger roles in criminal justice. It also might be possible to do a better
job monitoring and checking insiders, but the prospects for empowering and edu-
cating the general public are dim.
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INTRODUCTION
In colonial America, criminal justice was the business of laymen,
not lawyers. Lay constables arrested suspects, victims prosecuted
their own cases, and defendants defended themselves pro se. Lay
juries heard and decided all cases at public trials. Ordinary citizens
regularly watched these trials, and gossip about the trials quickly
spread through small colonial communities. Everyone could witness
punishment in the town square, as convicts swung from the scaffold or
languished in the stocks. In short, laymen participated in most crim-
inal cases and routinely saw criminal justice first-hand.
Today, however, criminal justice is the province of professionals.
A gulf divides the knowledgeable, powerful participants inside
American criminal justice from the poorly informed, powerless people
outside of it. The insiders-the judges, prosecutors, police, and
defense counsel who regularly handle criminal cases-are professional
repeat players who dominate criminal justice. They come to know the
kinds of crimes, defendants, and sentences that dominate the justice
system. They understand the intricate, technical rules that regulate
arrests, searches and seizures, interrogations, discovery, evidence, and
sentencing, as well as the going rates in plea bargaining. In short, they
are knowledgeable.
Insiders control the levers of power, deciding which cases to
charge, which crimes and defendants should receive probation, and
what prison sentences are appropriate. They reach many of these
decisions in private negotiating rooms and conference calls; in-court
proceedings are mere formalities that confirm these decisions. In an
earlier era, lay juries and the litigants themselves called many of these
shots at public trials. In a world in which plea bargaining resolves
almost 95% of cases,1 however, professionals (especially lawyers) run
the show.
1 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 426-27 tbl.5.24 (2004), available at http://
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t524.pdf (reporting that in fiscal year 2003, 95.4% of
criminal defendants in federal district court whose cases were not dismissed pleaded guilty
or no-contest); id. at 450 tbl.5.46, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t546.pdf (reporting that in 2000, 95% of state felony convictions resulted from guilty pleas).
These figures exemplify a trend in recent decades away from trials and toward pleas. As
recently as 1990, only 83.7% of federal criminal defendants whose cases were not dismissed
pleaded guilty or no-contest. Id. at 423 tbl.5.22, available at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t522.pdf (displaying increasing proportion of pleas and decreasing propor-
tion of trials since 1970s); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994, at 486 tbl.5.49 (1995), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/sbl994/sb1994-section5.pdf (reporting that in 1992,
92% of state felony convictions resulted from guilty pleas). While not all guilty pleas result
from plea bargains, most felony guilty pleas do. HERBERT S. MILLER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T
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Insiders also have a distinct set of incentives and practical con-
cerns. While they may share the public's intuitions about justice and
retribution, they also have self-interests in disposing of large caseloads
quickly, reducing their own workloads, rewarding cooperative
behavior, and ensuring certainty of conviction and sentence at the cost
of severity. Dealing face-to-face with offenders, they may develop
sympathy and see individualized mitigating and aggravating factors
that the public does not. There is also some evidence that insiders
mellow with time, perhaps because repeated exposure dulls outrage
and makes some crimes seem less heinous.
2
Outsiders, namely the general public and many victims, have a
very different perspective. To them, the criminal justice system seems
opaque, hidden behind closed doors, and cloaked in jargon, technicali-
ties, and euphemism. Public information about criminal justice is
notoriously inaccurate and outdated, derived from television and
movies in which trials are worlds away from the reality of plea bar-
gaining. Outsiders have few ways to learn about, let alone participate
in, the progress of most pending cases unless a newspaper publishes a
verdict or sentence after the fact. Instead of participating in jury
trials, the public must rely on sensationalist and often distorted media
accounts of atypical, high-profile cases, from which citizens overgener-
alize about the system as a whole. Politicians seize on these salient
examples to whip up popular outrage at what may be an aberration
rather than a trend. Thus, surveys show that outsiders consistently
underestimate the average nominal sentences for particular crimes
and so believe they need to be stiffened. In addition, outsiders do not
share insiders' agency costs, their aversion to risking acquittals, and
their jadedness or mellowing over time.
3
The result is an enduring tension between self-interested insiders
and excluded outsiders. The insiders have firsthand knowledge and
understanding, run the show, and accommodate their own pragmatic
concerns and self-interests. The outsiders find criminal justice
opaque, run by lawyers, and more concerned with efficiency and tech-
nicalities than with justice.
This tension is far from an absolute dichotomy. Insiders bring
their senses of justice to bear and not just their self-interests, and out-
siders can at least dimly see some of the practical constraints on
insiders. Moreover, outsiders are not by nature more harsh or puni-
tive. When surveyed in the abstract, outsiders say they believe the
OF JUSTICE, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1978) (basing this finding on
field research).
2 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
3 See infra Part I.C.
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criminal justice system is too lenient. But when confronted with
detailed cases, the public is often no more punitive than insiders,
4
apart from the jading or mellowing process mentioned earlier.
On average, however, insiders are more concerned with and
informed about practical constraints, and they are comfortable with
the trade-offs and the system that they themselves run. Outsiders,
knowing and caring less about practical obstacles and insiders' inter-
ests, focus on process values and offenders' just deserts. The gap in
information, participation, and self-interests causes insiders' and out-
siders' views to diverge. While victims and the public expect police
and prosecutors to represent their interests in a sense, each group has
a markedly different perspective.
I have previously explored some of the forces that can create rifts
between insider defense counsel and outsider criminal defendants.
5
This Essay focuses on different groups of insiders-namely, judges,
police, and especially prosecutors-and on different groups of out-
siders-namely, victims and the general public. The general public, in
turn, includes many subgroups. There are people affected by a partic-
ular crime, residents of high-crime neighborhoods, voters, citizens,
and aliens. Each group varies in its interests, knowledge, concerns,
and relative power. 6 Moreover, some groups straddle the insider-out-
sider fence, as they are better informed than the average outsider but
4 Though "criminal justice professionals and policy makers .. tend to overestimate
the punitiveness of public sentiment," in fact "a consistent result from most [sentencing]
studies is that the public is no more severe than judges." Julian V. Roberts & Loretta J.
Stalans, Crime, Criminal Justice, and Public Opinion, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME &
PUNISHMENT 31, 49 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998); see also Jeffrey A. Roth, Prosecutor Percep-
tions of Crime Seriousness, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 232, 235 (1978) (finding sugges-
tive evidence "that those who administer criminal justice may share a view of crime
seriousness with those who are administered by it").
The public might prefer sentences as harsh as the average nominal sentences specified
by insiders, but jaded insiders may nevertheless increase some sentences and discount
others more than the public would like, dispersing actual sentences. See infra Part I.B.
5 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2476-80, 2525-26 (2004). Of course, some repeat offenders are more like insiders,
while neophyte defendants are more like outsiders.
6 Victims have the strongest interest or stake in seeing justice done and in being vindi-
cated or avenged, as well as the greatest knowledge and power under some states' victims'
rights bills. Locals affected by a particular crime (whom I will call "affected locals") prob-
ably have the next-strongest interest in, knowledge about, and power in these particular
cases; after all, they are likely to be witnesses or complainants and may be scared or
scarred by witnessing crimes or narrowly avoiding victimization. Residents of high-crime
neighborhoods are not as directly invested in the outcomes of individual cases but have
more general personal concerns and knowledge. They may, however, be a politically pow-
erless group. Finally, the rest of the general public is likely to have the least direct interest
and concern and only more general forms of power, such as the ballot box. Nevertheless,
the general public does express its outrage and concerns about crime to its elected repre-
sentatives and candidates.
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lack the power of insiders. For example, residents of high-crime
neighborhoods are probably more knowledgeable and personally con-
cerned about the criminal justice system and so less like outsiders than
the general public as a whole.7 Despite their differences, the various
groups of outsiders share important interests and exercise power col-
lectively. Many outsiders, for example, vote and influence lawmaking
and law enforcement at the national and state levels as well as the
local level. Thus, this Essay will consider outsiders in the aggregate as
well as how particular subsets or communities of outsiders behave and
view insiders. Of necessity, the insider-outsider schema elides some
complexities and variations, but in return it highlights important char-
acteristics of each half of the divide.
Insiders' control of government is a chronic source of friction in a
democracy. In criminal justice and in many other areas, "street-level
bureaucrats" in effect make policy through their low-visibility exer-
cises of discretion. 8
Criminal justice, though, is special. Many ordinary citizens do not
exhibit rational apathy about criminal justice, but rather show pas-
sionate interest in how insiders handle it.9 The Sixth Amendment
enshrines public rights to information and participation in criminal
trials, though in practice plea bargaining subverts these rights. The
stakes are high in criminal justice as well: Defendants' lives, liberties,
and reputations compete with victims' rights, the public's security, and
the law's expressive and moral messages. Also, crime victims,
bystanders, and ordinary citizens have few procedural and no substan-
tive legal rights in criminal justice. Judges, police, and prosecutors are
not constrained by identifiable clients in the ways that, for example,
A person's subjective perceptions and concerns might also be relevant to classifying
that person. For example, voters with exaggerated fears of becoming victims may display
intense interest and concern in criminal justice and may acquire greater knowledge, even
though they will likely have less power than actual victims.
7 On the other hand, they may also be even more politically powerless than other
outsiders, which may exacerbate their alienation. Thus, my proposals to empower out-
siders may apply with special force to this group, whereas my proposals to provide better
information may not be as relevant to this group.
8 See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDI-
VIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 3-25 (1980).
9 Voters exhibit rational apathy when they do not bother to vote or invest in becoming
informed because the costs of voting or gathering information exceed the likely benefits to
that particular voter. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1108-09 (2003) (examining rational apathy in voting as component of
slippery slope phenomenon); cf. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-92
(1986) (detailing rational apathy problem in corporate context).
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teachers and welfare case workers are. 10 Thus, both the need for and
limits on democratic participation are particularly acute in the crim-
inal arena.
The gulf arises from a combination of procedural and substantive
rules. Most of the culprits are low-visibility procedures run by
insiders, such as arrest, charging, dismissal, plea-bargaining, and sen-
tencing procedures. Substantive criminal law and policy also shape
the gulf. Outsiders seek to raise sentences, for example, while insiders
may disagree with this substantive policy choice and subvert it proce-
durally. In other words, outsiders struggle with insiders to control
substantive policy, while insiders dominate procedures and so can
determine substantive outcomes. Substantive and procedural rules
interact in ways that are obscured by the academic divide between
substantive criminal law and criminal procedure. This Essay will both
highlight substantive and procedural forces and show how they
interact.
The gulf between criminal justice insiders and outsiders impairs
the law's efficacy in many ways. Some of these costs affect substantive
outcomes. For example, the gulf may provoke voters to vote for
bumper-sticker sentencing policies,11 such as mandatory minimum
sentences. It hinders public monitoring of agency costs as well,
leaving insiders too much room to indulge their own preferences at
the expense of outsiders' interests.
The gulf also inflicts substantive costs that are distinct from
bottom-line sentencing outcomes. It may cloud the substantive crim-
inal law's message and effectiveness by making the law too opaque to
deter and express condemnation well. In addition, the gulf obstructs
victims' sense of vindication, catharsis, and healing.
Finally, the gulf imposes procedural costs. It leads insiders to use
subterfuge to subvert democratically enacted laws. It also impairs
outsiders' faith in the law's legitimacy and trustworthiness, which
undercuts their willingness to comply with it. In short, the gulf
impedes the criminal law's moral and expressive goals as well as its
instrumental ones.
10 Cf LiPSKY, supra note 8, at 54-70 (trying, but failing, to fit police and judges into
model of how "relations with clients" constrain and shape street-level bureaucrats'
behavior).
11 1 dub these simplistic sentencing slogans "bumper-sticker sentencing policies"
because each one is crude enough to fit on a bumper sticker or a billboard. They are easy
enough for outsiders to understand and enact (perhaps through initiatives or referenda),
and they rest upon common-sense, intuitive judgments rather than subtle penological
expertise.
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Identifying this tension is the first step toward resolving it. We
cannot return to the eighteenth-century world of public jury trials, but
we can infuse the values of publicity and participation into the twenty-
first-century world of guilty pleas. If opacity frustrates and misleads
outsiders, transparency and fuller disclosure can alleviate these
problems. For example, we could find better ways to summarize and
publish accurate charging, conviction, and sentencing statistics. The
public, which thinks sentences are too lenient in part because it under-
estimates nominal sentences, would be more satisfied. Thus, pro-
viding more and better data might allay the impulse to ratchet up
sentences. If outsiders feel shut out, one solution is to give victims
and the public larger roles at charging, plea, and sentencing proceed-
ings. For example, sentencing circles and other restorative justice
reforms represent promising ways to give victims and other affected
locals a voice and a stake. 12
Greater transparency and participation would also facilitate the
monitoring of insiders by checking their self-interests and agency
costs. Furthermore, if policymakers want to use criminal law to send
messages, criminal procedure must help to make the messages clear
and simple enough to send to outsiders. This is a more charitable way
to understand sound-bite sentencing reforms, such as "three strikes
and you're out," as efforts by voters to participate in setting intelli-
gible policies and sending messages.
Though transparency and participation are no panaceas, they can
at least improve this state of affairs by countering misinformation.
Unfortunately, there is a limit to what these reforms can achieve. Pol-
iticians and the media play to both insiders and outsiders but do not fit
neatly into either camp. The news media and politicians have incen-
tives to find and exaggerate problems. No one will buy a newspaper
because the headline reads "Crime Stays Even for Third Year in a
Row." Stirring the pot wins television viewers and voters, and, psy-
chologically, people are more ready to generalize from a heartrending
anecdote than from dry statistics.
12 Restorative justice is an umbrella term for various voluntary, nonadversarial
processes that try to bring together offenders, crime victims, and others to repair the mate-
rial and intangible harms caused by crime. For example, victim-offender mediation
induces offenders to speak with their victims face-to-face about their crimes. Family group
conferences use trained facilitators to encourage discussions among the families of
offenders and victims. Circle sentencing encourages offenders, victims, their friends and
families, members of the community, and criminal justice professionals to discuss and
agree upon a sentence. Community reparative boards are panels of citizens that discuss
crimes with offenders and work out restitution plans. See Gordon Bazemore & Mark
Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative Conferencing Models, Juv. JUST. BULL., Feb.
2001, at 1-7, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/2012_1/contents.html.
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This Essay unfolds in three parts. Part I sketches out the origins
and dimensions of the gulf between insiders and outsiders. It shows
how opacity, domination by insiders, and practicalities such as agency
costs separate the world of lawyers from the world of laymen. Part
II.A explores how these differences create a spiral, as insiders set the
rules, outsiders react, and insiders undercut those reactions. Part II.B
discusses the harms that result from the lack of transparency, partici-
pation, and monitoring. Part III then turns to partial solutions,
ranging from the legislative process to charging, plea bargaining, and
sentencing. Insiders will always have more information, more power,
and more practical concerns than outsiders, and the media and politi-
cians will always exploit this gap, but reforms can at least reduce the
size of the gap. This Essay concludes with thoughts about how trans-
parency and participation might lead to reforms in penology, impris-
onment, and alternative sanctions.
I
THE GULF THAT SEPARATES INSIDERS FROM OUTSIDERS
A. What Criminal Justice Looked Like Before the Gulf
Today, few people look back fondly on eighteenth-century crim-
inal justice. Capital and corporal punishments, such as whipping and
the stocks, were commonplace. Women and minorities were excluded
from a system run by white men. These criticisms, while important,
obscure a key virtue that we have lost: Ordinary citizens regularly saw
criminal justice at work and took part in it.
Ordinary citizens played large roles in administering Anglo-
American criminal justice in the eighteenth century. As Lawrence
Friedman notes, "[clolonial justice was a business of amateurs. Ama-
teurs ran and dominated the system.' ' 13 Lay magistrates, lay consta-
bles, and lay juries ran criminal justice.14 Jurors were prized as
popular local voices who could represent and express the community's
sense of justice. 15 Grand and petit juries empowered ordinary citizens
to preserve their liberty, express their sense of justice, and check
agency costs and insiders' self-interests.1 6 The jury was also a way to
13 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27
(1993).
14 Id. at 28-30.
15 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183,
1186-89 (1991). The Supreme Court continues to emphasize the jury's populist role. As
the Court put it in one capital case, the role of the jury is to express "the conscience of the
community." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
16 Amar, supra note 15, at 1183-85; Essays by a Farmer IV (Mar. 21, 1788), in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 5, 37-40 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
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educate citizens about the justice system.' 7 Juries determined guilt or
innocence in most cases. In practice, they also often set sentences by
calibrating their verdicts to the punishments that seemed fitting.1
8
In addition, laymen, not lawyers, ran the criminal justice system.
Until at least the eighteenth century, most ordinary victims prose-
cuted and defendants defended their own felony cases pro se. 19 Even
after defendants gained the right to hire their own lawyers, most could
not afford them and continued to represent themselves. As a result,
trials were unencumbered by technical rules of procedure and evi-
dence because there were few lawyers to run them.
20
17 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274-76 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1988) (1835); Amar, supra note 15, at 1186-87.
18 Strictly speaking, this "pious perjury" was illegal, but it was quite common in prac-
tice, at least in England. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *239; see also J.M. BEATrIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660-1800,
at 419-21, 424-29 (1986) (noting historical examples of juries' determining sentences of
those they convicted); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial:
A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 22, 40-41, 52-55 (1983) (same).
19 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 10-12 (2003).
Defense counsel did, however, appear more frequently in misdemeanor cases, and public
prosecutors handled treason cases. Id. at 12-13, 36. Though this evidence comes from
England, the American colonies appear to have followed the English model. Under Dutch
influence, several of the mid-Atlantic colonies adopted some public prosecution in the
mid-seventeenth century. W. Scott van Alstyne, Jr., Comment, The District Attorney-A
Historical Puzzle, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 125, 132-37 (also suggesting that office apparently
died out thereafter in several of these colonies). By and large, however, public prosecutors
and defense counsel appear not to have become the norm in America until the nineteenth
century. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 246 n.1 (2003) (explaining that office of Massachusetts county
attorney was created in 1807); FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 57 ("[C~olonial trials were at
first as lawyerless as trials in England.... There were, after all, very few trained lawyers in
the colonies before the eighteenth century. Judges, too, were for the most part not law-
trained."); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 38 (1989) ("During the first half of the nineteenth century,
private prosecution dominated criminal justice in Philadelphia.... [Miost criminal prose-
cutions were initiated by private citizens."); Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power
of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1325-27
(2002) (explaining that while van Alstyne demonstrated existence of occasional public
prosecution in former Dutch colonies, public prosecution as institution did not take root
until much later; in New York, for example, it took root in mid-nineteenth century); James
D. Rice, The Criminal Trial Before and After the Lawyers: Authority, Law, and Culture in
Maryland Jury Trials, 1681-1837, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 455, 457 tbl.1 (1996) (noting that
between 1766 and 1771, only 27.5% of felony defendants and 15.1% of misdemeanor
defendants in Frederick County, Maryland had defense counsel).
20 Even into the first three decades of the nineteenth century, defense counsel
appeared in roughly a quarter of cases, and prosecution counsel were even rarer.
LANGBEIN, supra note 19, at 170 nn.302-03 (discussing English evidence); John H.
Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 261,
262-64 (1979) (same); see also FISHER, supra note 19, at 96-97 (inferring that few
Massachusetts defendants had defense counsel at beginning of nineteenth century and that
rate of defense representation rose to majority of defendants by mid-nineteenth century);
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The visible, public aspect of trials and punishment was essential
to this scheme. The Sixth Amendment guaranteed local, public trials,
which were fast and simple enough that viewers could understand
them. As Akhil Amar has shown, colonists prized public trials as a
safeguard for republican government. Public trials helped citizens to
learn their rights and duties, bring relevant information to court, mon-
itor government agents, prevent judicial corruption and favoritism,
and check witness perjury.21 They also "satisf[ied] the public that
truth had prevailed at trial," increasing public confidence in the
system.22 Villages were small, and many locals knew the victims, the
defendants, and what was happening in court.23 Punishment on the
gallows or in the stocks was a quick and public affair, indeed a blood-
thirsty spectacle, visible to all in the town square.24 In short, laymen
ran the system and watched the process and results firsthand. Ordi-
nary citizens and victims would literally see criminal justice being
done.
B. Insiders' Knowledge, Dominance, and Interests
Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, law-
yers supplanted ordinary citizens in criminal justice. Public prosecu-
tors displaced victims, and more defendants began hiring counsel.
25
As lawyers' dominance grew, judges developed intricate rules of pro-
cedure and evidence, further lengthening trials, cloaking them in
legalese, and reducing or excluding laymen's role. 26 Prosecutors and
judges also developed plea bargaining to avoid these increasingly
lengthy trials and to clear their expanding dockets.2 7 One effect of
STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 38 (noting that private citizens initiated most criminal prose-
cutions in Philadelphia in first half of nineteenth century). But see Rice, supra note 19, at
457 tbl.1 (noting that in Frederick County, Maryland between 1818 and 1825, 92.1% of
felony defendants and 36.1% of misdemeanor defendants were represented by counsel).
21 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
112-14 (1998).
22 Id. at 113.
23 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 23, 25-26.
24 See id. at 26; MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 7-9, 32-69 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). Needless to say, I am not arguing that
these spectacles were on balance desirable, let alone that we should return to the days of
pillories and scaffolds. My more modest point is that the abolition of these punishments
and professionalization of the system have brought with them unnoticed costs.
25 See FISHER, supra note 19, at 96-97; FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 67, 70; LANGBEIN,
supra note 19, at 113-36, 169-70 & nn.302-03. For an interesting look at how lawyers have
stolen victims' conflicts from them, see Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3-8 (1977).
26 See LANGBEIN, supra note 19, at 171-77, 196, 242-51, 253-310, 319-31.
27 FISHER, supra note 19, at 13, 31, 121-24 (explaining that prosecutors plea bargained
"to ease their crushing workloads" and that judges did so to offset their expanding civil
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
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plea bargaining was to reduce juries' roles and to hide cases from
public scrutiny. Finally, as capital punishment decreased and moved
outside the public view, and as imprisonment replaced corporal pun-
ishment, punishment became a private, concealed matter entrusted to
experts, instead of a public spectacle.
a8
These trends created the modern gulf between insiders and out-
siders in criminal justice. Insiders know and understand the complex
legal rules that govern the system and the typical kinds of crimes,
defendants, and punishments. 29 They see the witness interviews,
police files, and backroom negotiations that result in plea bargains in
most cases. Of course insiders' knowledge is not perfect, as hardly
anyone has a comprehensive view of the system, but these insiders
understand and control at least their own local fiefdoms.
Because insiders spend most of their time working in criminal jus-
tice, they have distinctive perspectives on how to run the criminal jus-
tice system. They have personal intuitions about just outcomes, which
at first may coincide with the public's intuitions. Their assessment of
just punishment tends to soften over time, however, as they become
jaded or mellower. 30 After one has seen many armed robberies, for
example, unarmed burglaries and thefts pale in comparison. And
while new insiders start out suspicious of plea bargaining, they grow
used to the system and eventually find it difficult or impossible to
imagine any other way. 31 In addition, insiders see defendants individ-
ually and up close, which may lead them to consider aggravating and
mitigating factors that the public and victims never learn about or
consider.
Insiders also have practical concerns about huge dockets and self-
interests in disposing of cases. Plea bargains guarantee certainty of
conviction and punishment. In exchange for certainty, risk-averse
prosecutors sacrifice severity to avoid possible acquittals that could
dockets); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 211,
240 (1979) (explaining that plea bargaining served as way of avoiding increasingly lengthy
and cumbersome criminal trials); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 3, 9-11 (1978) (same).
28 See FOUCAULT, supra note 24, at 14-16.
29 Bibas, supra note 5, at 2481, 2483, 2485. As noted in the Introduction, the insiders
whom I discuss are the criminal justice professionals; the most important ones are judges,
prosecutors, repeat defense counsel, and police.
30 See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCE OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 119-21 (1978) (describing how prosecutors undergo
this "mellowing process"). It may also be true that insiders differ systematically from out-
siders in their race, class, sex, culture, and levels of education, and that these differences
exacerbate the gulf between insiders' and outsiders' perspectives. I am, however, aware of
no empirical evidence to confirm this claim.
31 Id. at 89-91, 95-99, 117, 148-50, 153-55, 162.
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embarrass them and hurt their career prospects. 32 In addition, most
lawyers have little or no financial incentive to invest extra work in
pending cases instead of disposing of them quickly. 33 Indeed, defense
lawyers who receive flat or capped fees can earn more if they have
high turnover. 34 The press of large caseloads and limited funding and
support staff also pushes many lawyers and judges to settle quickly,
before investing much work. 35 The sooner each pending case goes
away, the earlier the lawyer or judge can go home to have dinner with
friends and family.36 Swift dispositions mean not only more leisure
time, but also better caseload and conviction statistics, the measures
by which judges and prosecutors assess their performance.
37 Of
course, lawyers and judges have nonfinancial interests in doing justice,
but few can avoid being influenced by finances and workloads as well.
Another factor reinforces insiders' focus on case-processing sta-
tistics: legal training. Many law schools train future judges and prose-
cutors to use cost-benefit, net-present-value analysis when assessing
32 Id. at 110-14; Bibas, supra note 5, at 2471-72, 2472 n.26.
33 Bibas, supra note 5, at 2471, 2476-77. Privately retained defense lawyers who charge
high hourly rates are an exception to this generalization, see id. at 2479, but they constitute
only a small fraction of the defense bar. See Caroline Wolf Harlow, Defense Counsel in
Criminal Cases, BUREAU JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REP., Nov. 2000, at 1, 3, available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdfldccc.pdf (reporting that in 1998, more than 80% of those
charged with violent felonies in largest urban counties had publicly financed attorneys, and
66% of felony defendants in federal district courts had publicly financed attorneys); see
also William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 10-11 (1997) (reporting that average court-appointed criminal
defense lawyer earns roughly "$30 or $40 an hour for the first twenty to thirty hours, and
zero thereafter").
34 Bibas, supra note 5, at 2477.
35 See id. at 2474, 2479 (discussing prosecutors' and defense attorneys' incentives to
dispose of their caseloads quickly through plea bargaining); FISHER, supra note 19, at 13,
40-44, 121-24 (discussing how funding and caseload pressures encourage prosecutors and
judges to dispose of criminal cases through plea bargaining); see also State v. Peart, 621 So.
2d 780, 784, 788-90 (La. 1993) (finding New Orleans public defender system ineffective
because counsel handled seventy active felony cases at once, amounting to 418 defendants
in space of seven months, and had inadequate support staff, library, and other resources; as
result, counsel's clients entered 130 guilty pleas at arraignment during this seven-month
period); cf Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion I: An Empirical
Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87
IOWA L. REV. 477, 542-44, 552-53 (2002) (finding statistically significant correlation
between federal prosecutors' workloads and declining federal drug sentences); Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Prosecutors' Offices Statistics, http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/
Search/Prosecutors/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005) (including downloadable dataset)
(reporting that in 2001 National Survey of Prosecutors, 26,425 prosecutors handled total of
14,975,073 criminal cases, for average of 566.7 criminal cases per prosecutor during year).
36 Bibas, supra note 5, at 2471.
37 Id. at 2471 & nn.21-22; FISHER, supra note 19, at 48-49; HEUMANN, supra note 30, at
144-48; Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 106-07, 106 n.138 (1968).
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outcomes. 38 Insiders, facing pressures to be efficient, may think that
low-visibility procedures do not matter so long as ultimate sentences
seem substantively acceptable to them. Most readers of this Essay,
trained as lawyers, probably lean toward evaluating bottom-line out-
comes the same way.
C. Outsiders' Exclusion and Sense of Justice
Criminal.justice outsiders see the system quite differently. 39
Much of the criminal justice system is hidden from their view. Police
do not announce which motorists they will stop and what crimes and
neighborhoods they will target. Prosecutors rarely explain publicly
why they have declined prosecution, pursued felony charges, or bar-
gained away imprisonment.40 Discovery occurs between the prose-
cutor and defense lawyer and is not made public.41 Strict secrecy
requirements cloak grand jury proceedings.42 Plea bargaining usually
occurs in conference rooms, courtroom hallways, or on private tele-
phone calls instead of open court.43 Important conferences take place
at sidebar or in judges' chambers. Public jury trials are the exception,
not the rule.44
38 See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology
into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 147 (2004); see also Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93
MICH. L. REV. 107, 111-14 (1994) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers
to Litigation Settlement] (describing standard law-and-economics rational-actor approach
to modeling settlements); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 96-101, 121-22,
124 (1997) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement]
(empirical study finding "that lawyers are more likely [than lay litigants] to explicitly or
implicitly employ expected financial value calculations when considering litigation
options" and are thus more likely to favor settlement).
39 As noted in the Introduction, by outsiders I mean victims, locals affected by the
crime, the general public, and, to a lesser extent, residents of high-crime neighborhoods.
One might also classify criminal defendants and potential defendants as outsiders, but they
are a special case. Some of them have been through the system often enough to under-
stand it and should count as insiders. Neophyte defendants are more like outsiders, but
their perspective differs enough from the general public's that it is simpler to exclude them
from the class of outsiders discussed in this Essay.
40 See Department of Justice Authorization and Oversight, 1981: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 1046 (1980) (supplemental statement of Assistant
Att'y Gen. Philip B. Heymann) ("[W]e can't talk very much about our declinations.... So
the public is often not given any detailed information on the reason for a declination; they
simply learn that an investigation of an obvious scoundrel has been closed.").
41 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (specifying procedures for government disclosures to
criminal defendants and vice versa).
42 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (federal grand jury secrecy rules).
43 See HEUMANN, supra note 30, at 115-16.
44 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Even those hearings that are technically open to public view are
in practice obscure. Hearings are often scheduled by conference call
or orders tucked away in dockets, and court clerks do not publicize
schedules. Plea and sentencing hearings are usually mere formalities
that rubber-stamp bargains struck in secret. 45 Victims desperately
want information about their cases; "one of the greatest sources of
frustration to them" is their lack of information. 46 Though victims'
bills of rights in many states promise victims notice of plea, sen-
tencing, and parole hearings, many victims still fail to receive notice.
47
Even when they do attend hearings, they have difficulty under-
standing them; legalese, jargon, euphemism, and procedural complexi-
ties garble court proceedings. Charge bargaining divorces convictions
from actual crimes so that, in court, murder becomes manslaughter
and burglary becomes breaking and entering. To outsiders, then, the
system seems at best mysterious, at worst frustrating and dishonest.
48
As a result, victims and the public may lose confidence in and respect
for the system.
49
The information that the general public does have is often inaccu-
rate, distorted, or outdated. Unlike insiders, outsiders do not have a
large, representative sample from which they can draw average or typ-
ical cases. Because the justice system is opaque, and most of the gen-
eral public has little direct experience with crime or criminal justice,
they must fall back on memorable, unrepresentative, sensationalistic
media accounts.50  Increased media coverage of crime may make
45 See FISHER, supra note 19, at 131-33; HEUMANN, supra note 30, at 134, 150.
46 Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restora-
tive Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 20-21; see also Jo-ANNE M. WEMMERS, VICTIMS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19-20 (1996).
47 PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 36-39 (2001);
Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 38, at 137. For a discussion of the gap between victims'
statutory rights and their implementation in procedural rules, see generally Paul G.
Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Proposed Amend-
ments in Light of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REV. 835.
48 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1411-12 (2003); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bar-
gaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 34 (2002) [hereinafter Wright & Miller, The
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff).
49 See infra Part II.B.2. Likewise, criminal defendants believe they have either cheated
justice or gotten bad deals for mysterious reasons, breeding cynicism. See Wright & Miller,
The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 48, at 95-96 (arguing that defendants who
believe their sentences turned more on plea negotiations than on their underlying crimes
lose respect for law).
50 Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 748-49 (2005);
Lawrence W. Sherman, Trust and Confidence in Criminal Justice, NAT'L INST. JUST. J.,
Mar. 2002, at 22, 28-29. Of course, those with direct experience with crime and justice,
particularly residents of high-crime neighborhoods, do not need to rely on these accounts
as much.
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crime seem more frequent, salient, and important, even though crime
has decreased in recent years.51 News media report violent crime and
unusually lenient sentences, instead of more prevalent minor crimes
and average sentences. 52 Even patently fictional crime dramas influ-
ence viewers. Many citizens' sense of the criminal justice system
comes from movies or television shows that build open-and-shut cases
on forensic evidence and end with swift jury trials. 53 That portrait is
anachronistic and ignores the dominance of plea bargaining today.
5 4
Like crime dramas, news stories focus on atypical cases that go to
trial, such as the trials of the Washington snipers (John Muhammad
and Lee Boyd Malvo), Timothy McVeigh, O.J. Simpson, Michael
Jackson, and Martha Stewart. A viewer who watched only these trials
might conclude that most defendants proceed to trial and are con-
victed there, unless perhaps they are celebrities who can afford great
lawyers. Media coverage of the Columbine school shooting was
enough to create the impression of a wave of school shootings.
55 Poli-
ticians likewise publicize and exploit anecdotes as if they were symp-
tomatic of trends: Witness the sudden explosion of crack-cocaine
penalties in response to basketball player Len Bias's cocaine over-
51 For thoughtful discussions of the possible direct and indirect linkages between media
crime coverage and public opinion, see Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects
for Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 425-28 (discussing how
news media's deluge of crime stories helped to set political agenda and may have increased
public's fear of crime); Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political,
Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Fed-
eral) Criminal Law, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 44-51 (1997) (same).
52 Barkow, supra note 50, at 749-50. The media occasionally report freakishly harsh
sentences as well, but anecdotes of leniency seem more likely to scare and thus attract
viewers.
53 See, e.g., CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (CBS television series); L.A. Law (NBC
television series). Apparently, jurors who have seen CSI come to expect airtight forensic
evidence in every case and "are reluctant to convict" in cases that lack forensic evidence.
See Jamie Stockwell, Defense, Prosecution Play to New 'CSI' Savvy; Juries Expecting TV-
Style Forensics, WASH. POST, May 22, 2005, at Al; The CSI Effect, JUR-E BULL. (Nat'l Ctr.
for State Courts, Arlington, Va.), July 29, 2005, available at http://view.exacttarget.com/
?ffccl7-fe911575756d027574-fe2c1572736c0575771774; see also Juror Evaluation Forms,
U.S. Dist. Court, S. Dist. Iowa (May 2-3, 2005) (on file with the New York University Law
Review) ("Before coming to this court case, I tho't [sic] there had to be physical evi-
dence ... to bring a person to trial. I still think that may be the way it should be."). More
than 61% of those surveyed regularly or sometimes get their information about the courts
from such television dramas, and more than 40% do the same from television reality shows
such as Judge Judy. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE
COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 19 fig.7 (1999).
54 Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1148-49 (2001).
55 See Joel Best, Monster Hype, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2002, at 51, available at http://
www.educationnext.org/20022/50.html (describing school shootings as "phantom epi-
demic" and noting that "[i]n large part, media coverage promoted this distorted view of the
problem").
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dose. 56 Collectively, these news and fictional stories leave outsiders
with a memorable but misleading picture of the kinds of crimes and
cases that dominate criminal justice. The image is one of glamorous,
sensational trials in major cases, not the reality of endless, rapid plea
bargaining in myriad minor cases.
Based on these atypical media accounts, outsiders form genera-
lized opinions ex ante about crime and punishment in the abstract. 57
Because outsiders no longer participate in criminal justice, the general
public does not see the aggravating and mitigating facts of individual
real cases. When people receive too simple a description of a crime,
they mentally fill in the blanks and base the sentences they would
impose on stereotypes or on memorable or recent examples. 58 When
people consider the actual details as jurors ex post, their perspectives
change dramatically. 59 For instance, even though 88% of survey
56 In 1986, popular publications such as Time magazine were abuzz about the advent of
crack cocaine. E.g., Jacob V. Lamar, Jr., Crack: A Cheap and Deadly Cocaine Is a
Spreading Menace, TIME, June 2, 1986, at 16; Evan Thomas, America's Crusade: What Is
Behind the Latest War on Drugs, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 60 (cover story); see William A.
Henry III, Reporting the Drug Problem: Have Journalists Overdosed on Print and TV Cov-
erage?, TIME, Oct. 6, 1986, at 73 ("Crack has dominated media attention during the recent
surge in drug coverage," including many television, magazine, and front-page newspaper
articles.). That June, college basketball star Len Bias died of a cocaine overdose. Congress
then rushed to pass new crack-cocaine penalties in time for the November election. As the
bill wended its way through Congress, politicians kept raising the penalties to prove their
toughness, until the bill provided for five grams of crack cocaine to receive the same pen-
alty as 500 grams of powder cocaine. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1294-96 (1995).
57 See Barkow, supra note 50, at 748-50 (describing how voters base ideas about crime
and sentencing on especially heinous crimes reported in media); see also JOHN DOBLE,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE PUBLIC'S VIEW 14, 16 (1987) (reporting that many focus
group participants focused on "recent highly publicized crimes," notably string of child
murders, and exaggerated incidence of violent crimes); Loretta J. Stalans, Measuring Atti-
tudes to Sentencing, in CHANGING ATTITUDES TO PUNISHMENT: PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME
AND JUSTICE 15, 23-24 (Julian V. Roberts & Mike Hough eds., 2002) (noting that people
base answers to general questions about punishment on atypical and extreme images of
criminals often taken from media).
58 James P. Lynch & Mona J.E. Danner, Offense Seriousness Scaling: An Alternative to
Scenario Methods, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 309, 311 (1993); see also Paul H.
Robinson, Some Doubts About Argument by Hypothetical, 88 CAL. L. REV. 813, 819-23
(2000) (explaining that frequently, hypothetical crime scenarios are too sketchy and leave
respondents to mentally fill in many details relevant to blameworthiness, which makes it
dangerous to generalize from respondents' resulting judgments of blameworthiness);
Stalans, supra note 57, at 22 (describing study that found that subjects who were given
descriptions of serious burglary case before determining sentence in typical case tended to
give higher sentences to typical offender).
59 See Barkow, supra note 50, at 750-51 (suggesting that when members of public
assess appropriate sentences ex post in context of detailed case files, they are far less
harsh); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1276, 1283-84 (2005) (arguing that ex post sentencing deliberations by judges or jurors
based on particular facts would check political process's excesses); Edward Zamble &
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respondents favored a mandatory three-strikes statute in the abstract,
most favored one or more exceptions when presented with specific
cases. 60 A set of four Canadian surveys had some respondents read
newspaper accounts of a sentencing and others read court transcripts
and the defendant's criminal record in the same case. Readers of the
newspaper accounts consistently rated the sentences as more lenient
than did readers of the court transcripts.
61
Because ordinary citizens have very poor information about how
the criminal justice system actually works, they suffer from mispercep-
tions.62 In polls, the public says in the abstract that it thinks that
judges sentence too leniently. 63 The general public, however, regu-
larly underestimates penalties. For instance, most Vermonters sur-
veyed thought that rapists who wield knives often are not imprisoned.
Criminal justice insiders in Vermont, however, maintain that such rap-
ists definitely go to prison, almost certainly for at least fifteen years. 64
South Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia jurors greatly underestimated
how long capital murderers would have to be imprisoned before being
paroled. Perhaps as a result, they returned death sentences. 65
Kerry Lee Kalm, General and Specific Measures of Public Attitudes Toward Sentencing, 22
CAN. J. BEHAV. Sci. 327, 330-32, 330 tbl.1 (1990) (finding that when asked general poll
questions, most survey subjects say that criminal justice system is too lenient, but when
asked to assign sentences for four specific crimes, respondents' sentences were close to
actual sentences, though more severe for breaking and entering and to lesser extent for
theft).
60 Brandon K. Applegate et al., Assessing Public Support for Three-Strikes-and-You're-
Out Laws: Global Versus Specific Attitudes, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 517, 522 tbl.2, 525,
528-39, 529 tbl.4 (1996).
61 Anthony N. Doob & Julian Roberts, Public Punitiveness and Public Knowledge of
the Facts: Some Canadian Surveys, in PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO SENTENCING: SURVEYS
FROM FIVE COUNTRIES 111, 126-32 (Nigel Walker & Mike Hough eds., 1988). Indeed, in
at least one notorious Canadian case, a majority of newspaper readers rated the actual
sentence as too lenient, while a majority of the readers of court documents saw the same
sentence as too harsh. Id. at 128-29. Of course, one cannot be certain that these Canadian
findings apply equally to America, but given the two countries' similarities and overlap in
culture and media, the findings are at least suggestive.
62 Once again, this statement is less true of those with direct experience with crime and
justice, such as residents of high-crime neighborhoods.
63 E.g., JULIAN V. ROBERTS ET AL., PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC OPINION: LESSONS
FROM FIVE COUNTRIES 27 (2003); Roberts & Stalans, supra note 4, at 49; see BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS 2002, at 140-41 tbl.2.43 (2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
sb2002/sb2002-section2.pdf.
64 JOHN DOBLE RESEARCH Assocs. & JUDITH GREENE, ATTITUDES TOWARD CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN VERMONT: PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT AN EXPERIMENT WITH RESTOR-
ATIVE JUSTICE 14 & n.5 (2000).
65 Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in
Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1993) (reviewing juror misinformation in death
penalty cases in South Carolina); Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, Deathly
Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18
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In fact, sentences are often as tough as or tougher than the gen-
eral public would want. For example, in one empirical study, roughly
two-thirds of Illinois residents thought that Illinois judges sentenced
burglars too leniently. Yet when given a concrete burglary scenario,
89% of them preferred penalties below two years' imprisonment, the
effective statutory minimum. 66 Another Illinois study, involving four
hypothetical scenarios, found that judges' sentences were equally or
more severe than laymen's sentences.67 In a California survey that
gave brief descriptions of six crimes, respondents preferred sentences
as low as or lower than the typical punishments prescribed by
statute.68 Another study found "remarkable agreement between
average respondent sentences and [federal] guidelines sentences.
69
Many other studies found that, when asked to sentence detailed cases,
the public is no harsher and may indeed be more lenient than judges.
70
The public's agreement with insiders on average sentences con-
ceals troubling disparities and variations. Prosecutors sometimes raise
sentences above the statutory or guideline minimum by stacking
charges or adding enhancements. In other cases, they use charge or
sentence bargaining to lower real sentences beneath the nominal min-
imum or guideline sentences that the public thinks appropriate. Out-
siders have little way to review or check these hidden charging and
plea-bargaining decisions. A particularly lenient plea bargain in one
case may mislead outsiders into thinking sentences are too light across
the board. They may thus push for higher nominal penalties, not real-
izing that insiders will apply them inconsistently and use them as bar-
gaining chips. The result may be that arbitrary sentence dispersion
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 211, 220-25 (1987) (recounting poll of potential jurors in
Georgia capital case); William W. Hood, III, Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia
Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1623-27
(1989) (summarizing results of survey of potential capital jurors in Virginia).
66 Loretta J. Stalans & Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay Evalua-
tions of Criminal Sentencing: Misperception and Discontent, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 199,
202 & n.1, 205-07, 206 tbl.2, 207 tbl.3 (1990).
67 Shari Seidman Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency in Sen-
tencing, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 73, 75-81 (1989).
68 William Samuel & Elizabeth Moulds, The Effect of Crime Severity on Perceptions of
Fair Punishment: A California Case Study, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 931, 938-40,
939 tbl.1 (1986). Indeed, the respondents' proposed sentences for five of the six crimes-
auto theft, theft of $1000, armed robbery, armed rape, and homicide-appear to be lower
than the sentences prescribed by statute as the middle or normal term. Id.
69 PETER H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES
AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED 149 (1997).
70 JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETITA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE 210-12 (1997).
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increases as some defendants receive freakishly high sentences and
others much lower ones.
71
In short, misperceptions about average sentences fuel spiraling
sentences and discontent with criminal justice. Because voters are
badly misinformed, they clamor for tougher sentences, three-strikes
laws, and mandatory minima across the board. This pressure is an
artifact of poor information and ex ante consideration; voters are not
as reflexively punitive as one might think. The average voter, if fully
informed, would likely think that the sentences on the books are
tough enough.
Many outsiders also want to participate in criminal justice,
though they do not want to take charge of the process. 72 More than
75% of victims surveyed considered it very important to be heard or
involved in charge dismissals, plea negotiations, sentencings, and
parole proceedings. 73 Participating makes victims feel empowered
and helps them to heal emotionally.74 More generally, citizens report
that participating in the legal system increases their respect for the
system and empowers them.7
5
In reality, victims, affected locals, and ordinary citizens rarely
participate actively in criminal proceedings. In theory, citizens run
grand juries, but in practice they are dominated by prosecutors and
would "indict a ham sandwich" if prosecutors asked them to do so.
76
71 Cf. Bibas, supra note 5, at 2483-85 (discussing how knowledgeable defense counsel
negotiate plea bargains substantially below applicable mandatory minimum penalties,
while clients of less experienced defense lawyers are more likely to receive those
mandatory penalties).
72 See WEMMERS, supra note 46, at 208 (discussing crime victims' desires).
73 Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., The Rights of Crime Victims-Does Legal Protection Make
a Difference?, NAT'L INST. JUST.: RES. IN BRIEF, Dec. 1998, at 4, available at http://
ncjrs.org/pdffiles/173839.pdf.
74 Strang & Sherman, supra note 46, at 21.
75 See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCE-
DURAL JUSTICE 106 (1988) ("The perception that one has had an opportunity to express
oneself and to have one's views considered by someone in power plays a critical role in
fairness judgments."); ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 163 (1990) (arguing
that "an opportunity to take part in the decision-making process" contributes significantly
to perceptions that procedures are fair); Brian L. Cutler & Donna M. Hughes, Judging Jury
Service: Results of the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts Juror Survey, 19
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 305, 311 (2001) (reporting that jury service improved opinions of justice
system of more than 20% of jurors); Daniel W. Shuman & Jean A. Hamilton, Jury Ser-
vice-It May Change Your Mind: Perceptions of Fairness of Jurors and Nonjurors, 46 SMU
L. REV. 449, 468 (1992) (reporting that those with jury experience view criminal justice
system to be about 11% fairer than nonjurors do); Telephone Interview with Judge Robert
W. Pratt, U.S. Dist. Judge, S. Dist. of Iowa (July 15, 2005) (reporting, based on empirical
data from survey forms returned by ex-jurors, that they consistently gained respect for
system, learned great deal, and came away impressed with importance of their service).
76 David Margolick, Law Professor to Administer Courts in State, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1,
1985, at B2 (quoting then-Chief Judge Sol Wachtler of New York Court of Appeals).
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Similarly, citizens run petit juries, but in practice most cases never
make it to jury trials. 77 In many states, victims and citizens have no
say in decisions to arrest, charge, and plea bargain. 78 Even at sen-
tencing, a large majority of felony victims are absent.79 When they are
present, many victims merely read prepared victim-impact statements
or, more commonly, submit written statements before sentencing °80
They do not face defendants and, unlike judges, cannot engage in col-
loquies with them8' or with the lawyers. Affected locals and ordinary
citizens do not enjoy even this much participation.
Moreover, outsiders do not fully share insiders' self-interests and
pragmatic concerns. For the most part, victims care only about their
own cases, and they often care passionately. Victims and ordinary citi-
zens do not care much about maximizing judges' and lawyers' win-loss
records, case-processing statistics, profitability, or leisure time. To
outsiders, many of these insider concerns may seem illegitimate and
selfish. Outsiders base punishment judgments primarily on their intu-
itions about retributive justice. 2 They only dimly glimpse the
caseload pressures, funding limitations, and risks of acquittal that
induce plea bargains, in part because criminal justice is so opaque. If
they had better information, they might acknowledge these practical
constraints and the need to trade off some severity for the certainty of
punishing more offenders. Even if they were fully informed, outsiders
77 Supra note 1.
78 DouGLAs E. BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 201-02, 235-37, 279,
462-64 (1999).
79 TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 47, at 96-98 (reviewing studies). Though, as noted earlier,
a majority of victims want to take part, many victims may be unaware of sentencing hear-
ings because prosecutors never notify them. Others may decline to attend because the law
gives them inadequate rights to participate; if they are consigned to be powerless
observers, they may see little reason to attend.
80 Id. at 97.
81 Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 38, at 99-100.
82 See Roberts & Stalans, supra note 4, at 48 (noting importance of retribution in
public's attitudes about sentencing); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal
Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 240-41 (2000) ("[T]hese studies strongly suggest that
intuitive punishment judgments are not directly tailored to consequentialist goals."); Cass
R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 Sup. Cr. ECON. REv. 171, 175-76 (2004)
("This study strongly suggests that punishment judgments are retributive in character, not
tailored to consequentialist goals .... These studies indicate that when assessing punish-
ment, people's judgments are rooted in outrage; they do not focus solely on social conse-
quences, at least not in any simple way."); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of
Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 414-19, 472-76 (1999) (arguing that deterrence does
not explain people's attitudes toward crime and punishment but instead serves as rationali-
zation or rhetoric to conceal disagreements rooted in their moral values). Though most
outsiders base their intuitive punishment judgments primarily on their retributive instincts,
the criminal justice system simultaneously tries to serve other goals as well. See infra text
accompanying notes 141, 168.
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probably would not give self-interest and other practical constraints as
much weight as insiders do. For example, outsiders are probably less
risk averse than prosecutors, who fear that acquittals will result in per-
sonal embarrassment, so outsiders would often not settle as easily.
83
And outsiders do not mellow or become jaded as time goes by, as they
do not see the repetitive cycle of cases that desensitize insiders.
Finally, outsiders are laymen, not lawyers. As noted earlier,
insider lawyers tend to focus on bottom-line sentence outcomes.
8 4
Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie's empirical work, however, finds
that laymen take into account much more than bottom-line outcomes
when evaluating settlements. Lay litigants care about a much wider
array of justice concerns than do lawyers, including their own status,
the other side's blameworthiness, and apologies. 85 Their approach is
completely rational, and it suggests that insiders may take too narrow
a view when evaluating what factors matter to outsiders. 86 Outsiders
care about sentences, but they also care about a host of process bene-
fits that come from transparency and participation. Efficiency-minded
insiders, however, do little to deliver these process goods.
II
THE RESULTING POLITICAL SPIRAL
A. The Political Dynamic
In many countries, political elites set criminal justice policy and
have some freedom to ignore the public's wishes. Many European
countries, for example, abolished the death penalty in spite of public
83 Bibas, supra note 5, at 2471-72. As I argued in that article, plea bargaining is far
from a rational, efficient market in which prosecutors seek only to maximize retribution,
deterrence, or some other measure of justice. Many other factors enter into their calculus.
Id. Even though fully informed outsiders would likely acknowledge the need for some
plea bargaining, they would likely strike different bargains because they lack insiders' self-
interests and mellowing over time.
84 See supra text accompanying note 38.
85 See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement, supra note
38, at 148-50; Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement, supra note 38,
at 99-101, 108-12, 121-22, 124, 133-34. Both studies dealt with civil settlements. Richard
Bierschbach and I have argued elsewhere that these concerns are likely to be even more
powerful in criminal cases, because crime victims and offenders have powerful needs to
heal, reconcile, learn lessons, and reintegrate into society. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra
note 38, at 109-18.
86 See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement, supra note 38, at
129-36 (explaining that clients may legitimately seek to maximize ends other than wealth
and that lawyers should not substitute their own utility functions for those of their clients;
giving example of client whose auto accident settlement decision is influenced by desire to
maintain "'BMW' level of status").
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opinion rather than because of it.87 European political elites are evi-
dently better able to resist popular pressure to change criminal justice
policies than their American counterparts. 88 America's political
economy is more responsive to popular pressure, giving organized
groups of voters tools with which to challenge or regulate insiders'
policies. 8
9
Because insiders are powerful and knowledgeable, but outsiders
can exercise sporadic political pressure, a spiral ensues. Insiders use
their procedural discretion to apply the laws on the books selectively
to suit their own interests and goals. After a lead or lag time, out-
siders episodically learn of these maneuvers and react by pushing for
new substantive and procedural laws. Insiders then use their proce-
dural powers to twist the new laws, provoking outsiders to push for
tougher substantive laws and mandatory procedural strictures.
Insiders, however, continue to find new procedural ways to subvert
even mandatory laws. The spiral never ends, though insiders usually
maintain the upper hand.
Step One: Insiders' Procedural Discretion Shapes the Rules in
Action
We start with a system of criminal laws and punishments on the
books. In America, however, the law on the books often is tenuously
related to the law in action because insiders enforce the law only as far
as they see fit. In other words, they use their wide procedural discre-
tion to enforce substantive law selectively. As Bill Stuntz has persua-
sively argued, criminal laws do not create binding obligations but
87 STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 301 (2002);
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 23
(2003).
88 BANNER, supra note 87, at 301 (noting that European governments were able to
abolish death penalty in face of popular support for it because their elected officials feel
less pressure than American politicians do to implement majority's preferred policies);
JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 13-15, 199-201 (2003) (explaining that strong
culture of deference to bureaucracies in France and Germany "works both to shield the
state from the [tough-on-crime] pressures of democratic politics and to manage prisons and
other punishments in a sober and disciplined way"); Joshua Micah Marshall, Death in
Venice, NEW REPUBLIC, July 31, 2000, at 12, 14 (explaining that European parliamentary
government makes it harder for upstarts to seize power and for single-issue politics to rock
established party platforms; noting also that political elites dictate these platforms and that
elites can defy popular support for death penalty).
89 For example, not only do American voters vote for representatives every few years,
but many states also permit them to use ballot initiatives, referenda, and recall petitions to
pass laws directly and discipline elected representatives.
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rather a menu of options for insiders. 90 Police need not arrest, and
prosecutors may decide either not to charge at all or to divert defen-
dants to drug treatment in lieu of punishment.91 When they do
charge, they can often choose from a variety of possible felony and
misdemeanor charges. And when prosecutors do not like the existing
rules, they persuade legislatures to enact more rules to give them
more substantive and procedural options.92 Prosecutors and defense
counsel can bargain around most rules.93 For example, they can agree
to forfeitures, restitution, or cooperation against other defendants as
full or partial substitutes for criminal punishment. 94 Judges have flexi-
bility to dismiss cases, to suggest settlement, and to hint at light or
heavy sentences if the parties go along or refuse to do so. Finally,
parole and good-time credits create flexible gaps between nominal
and real sentences, allowing insiders to set real prison sentences far
below nominal ones.95 These tools are often obscure or hidden from
public view. Even when the public hears about these tools, it may not
grasp their significance.
90 William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549-58 (2004).
91 Options include declining to arrest, declining to charge, deferring prosecution
pending successful drug treatment or restitution, and post-charge diversion of cases into
drug treatment. Defendants whose cases are diverted may have their charges or sentences
suspended or receive probationary sentences. Many of these options are restricted to or
used most often for minor crimes. Studies show that prosecutors decline to prosecute a
substantial minority of cases (between a quarter and a half) and divert a smaller fraction
(fewer than 5% of felonies but more misdemeanors). See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F.
WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 801,
802-03, 808-09, 811-12, 818-19 (2d ed. 2003).
92 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 534-35 (2001) (arguing that police and prosecutors constitute "very powerful lobb[ies]
on criminal law issues"). Stuntz gives two examples: When prosecutors found it too diffi-
cult to prove criminal attempt, legislatures made prosecutors' jobs easier by criminalizing
solicitation; and when prosecutors found it too difficult to prove burglary, legislatures
made prosecutors' jobs easier by criminalizing possession of burglars' tools. See id. at
537-38, 537 n.131.
93 See Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litiga-
tion, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 114-15, 118-19 (1999) (describing types of concessions made
by both prosecutors and defense counsel in plea bargaining).
94 See id. at 118-19.
95 Right now I am discussing the first step in the spiral, before the public catches on and
reacts. Once the public learns of the pervasive discounting of sentences, it reacts to this
perceived dishonesty by demanding truth-in-sentencing laws and abolishing parole. See
infra notes 103-14 and accompanying text. The key point is that the system's opacity cre-
ates a lead time or lag between insiders' maneuvers and outsiders' reactions. At first, that
meant that insiders could be lenient without outsiders' knowledge. Now, it explains why
many citizens still assume that parole will discount sentences, long after many states and
the federal government have abolished parole. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying
text (discussing citizens' systematic underestimation of actual sentences).
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Unsurprisingly, insiders use these tools in part to serve their self-
interests and pragmatic concerns. Police avoid making arrests and
prosecutors avoid bringing (and pursuing) charges in cases that are
troublesome and not easy to win, such as domestic abuse cases. 96
Prosecutors may decline cases entirely or divert some defendants to
drug treatment in part to limit their workloads. They may file mul-
tiple initial charges to give themselves plea-bargaining chips. They
may avoid charging troublesome cases to spare themselves effort,
headaches, and possible acquittals. They may use plea bargaining to
help rack up relatively easy convictions and avoid risking embar-
rassing acquittals at the expense of sentence severity.97 They reward
speedy pleas to discourage time-consuming motions, extensive dis-
covery, and protracted negotiations. 98 They may be tempted to push a
few strong cases to trial to gain marketable experience while bar-
gaining away weak ones. 99 On the other side, defense lawyers may
recommend plea agreements to their clients in part to lighten their
workloads, dispose of cases easily, and earn quick fees. 100 They may
even use pessimistic forecasts and slanted assessments to push their
clients toward pleas. 101 Judges use their leverage over sentences to
encourage prompt guilty pleas, in effect penalizing those who go to
96 At least, police and prosecutors were reluctant to bring domestic abuse cases until
legislatures enacted shall-arrest and pro-prosecution policies, as described infra notes
132-33 and accompanying text. See also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, UNDER THE
RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 21-22,
33-34 (1982) (reporting police and prosecutorial practices in cases of domestic violence);
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859-64 (1996) (describing move toward
mandatory arrest and pro-prosecution policies in domestic violence cases); Lawrence W.
Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, POLICE
FOUND. REP., Apr. 1984, at 1-2, available at http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/min-
neapolisdve.pdf (describing traditional police reluctance to arrest in domestic violence
cases and reporting data that suggest that arrest is most effective police method for
reducing domestic violence).
97 Bibas, supra note 5, at 2471-72; see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002) (describing standard "fast
track" plea bargain, which requires defendants to waive most discovery, indictment, trial,
and appeal and plead guilty in exchange for sentencing concessions); State v. Laforest, 665
A.2d 1083, 1085 (N.H. 1995) (describing plea agreement that conditioned prosecutor's dis-
missal of two charges and recommendation of reduced sentences upon defendant's
accepting plea by date of pretrial conference and defense counsel's agreement not to file
motions or take depositions).
99 Bibas, supra note 5, at 2472-73.
00 Id. at 2476-77, 2479, 2482. But see id. at 2479 (noting that well-paid, privately
retained lawyers may have financial incentives to invest extra work in cases, and that
defense lawyers who volunteer for court appointments may resist pleas to gain trial experi-
ence for themselves).
101 Id. at 2525-26.
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trial. By doing so, they improve their case-processing statistics and
avoid time-consuming jury trials and possible appellate reversal.10 2
Step Two: Outsiders Try to Check Insiders
In a few respects, some outsiders' concerns shape insiders' self-
interests and their exercises of procedural discretion. For example,
most district attorneys are elected.10 3 Because they face electoral
pressure to maximize convictions, they push their unelected subordi-
nates to increase conviction rates. 04 Three things are noteworthy
about this influence. First, it works because voters have access to min-
imal information (mostly in the form of conviction statistics) and can
participate at the ballot box.105 Second, it is candidates for office who
publicize this information, as district attorneys or their opponents
seize on a few statistics to bring them to voters' attention. Third, the
influence is imperfect because the information is imperfect. District
attorneys can create the misleading impression of toughness by
touting 99.5% conviction rates, when in fact most of those convictions
come from lenient pleas. Unlike conviction statistics, sentencing sta-
tistics usually are not readily available to the public, so the public
cannot check the bargains being struck. 106 District attorneys who
push a few high-profile cases to trial and lose may lose their jobs as a
result.10 7 The upshot is that risk-averse prosecutors plea bargain more
102 See HEUMANN, supra note 30, at 140-45.
103 See Carol J. DeFrances & Greg W. Steadman, Prosecutors in State Courts, 1996,
BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., July 1998, at 1 (reporting that more than 95% of chief prose-
cutors are elected locally).
104 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 182 (2004) ("[Tlhe institutional culture of most
prosecutors' offices treasures convictions, and an attorney's conviction rate may serve as a
barometer of that person's stature within the organization and a key factor in determining
that person's chances for internal advancement."); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good
Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 355, 390 (2001) ("The same
pressure [to win] is present in ordinary, run-of-the-mill cases. The pressure is both
external, the result of the inherently political nature of prosecution, and internal, the result
of policies relating to salary and promotion.").
105 Of course, not all of the public can vote. Aliens and many convicted felons, for
example, lack the right to vote, so their voices carry little weight.
106 See Alschuler, supra note 37, at 106-07 (noting that prosecutors measure themselves
on convictions rather than sentencing statistics and that "detailed sentencing statistics are
rarely compiled").
107 At the very least, visible trial losses give fodder to electoral opponents and
encourage them to run against incumbents. See, e.g., Andrea Ford, The Simpson Verdicts;
The Prosecution: Another Stumble; The D.A.'s Office Adds to Its List of High-Profile
Defeats, Which Could Leave Gil Garcetti Vulnerable in Next Year's Election, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1995, at A3; Mitchell Landsberg, Garcetti's Chances Were Slim, Analysts Say, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, at B1 (reporting that O.J. Simpson's not guilty verdict likely hurt
District Attorney Gil Garcetti in his failed bid for re-election).
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than fully informed voters would like, because voters see only convic-
tion statistics and not charging or sentencing statistics.
Occasionally, an anecdote will capture the public's attention and
lead to reform. The story of Megan Kanka's rape and murder by a
recidivist child molester led to a push for sex-offender registration, for
example. 108 Sometimes, politicians exploit or exacerbate these con-
cerns. The Willie Horton advertisement in the 1988 presidential cam-
paign played on public fears that violent criminals were being released
into their communities too soon. 10 9 Partly in response, many states
restricted or abolished parole. 110
Media coverage also fans readers' and viewers' fears of crime,
provoking public reactions.' For example, extensive media coverage
of a 1992 carjacking and murder misleadingly suggested that a
carjacking "wave" was sweeping America.11 2 As a result, the public
clamored for politicians and prosecutors to create new crimes and
penalties. To take a different example, the 1972 book Criminal
Sentences: Law Without Order exposed the lawlessness of sentencing
discretion and sparked the sentencing-reform movement. 113 Liberals
worried about racial and class disparities at sentencing, and conserva-
tives inveighed against lenient sentences by soft-on-crime judges.
108 See Megan Nicole Kanka Foundation, Mission, http://www.megannicolekanka
foundation.org/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) (recounting how this crime led
400,000 citizens to sign petitions and New Jersey state legislature to pass Megan's Law in
"an unprecedented eighty-nine days").
109 In the 1988 presidential campaign, a political action committee ran a television
advertisement attacking Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis for granting weekend
prison furloughs to convicted murderer Willie Horton. While on a furlough, the advertise-
ment noted, Horton stabbed a man and raped a woman. A 30-Second Ad on Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1988, at B20 (transcript and description of advertisement).
110 See, e.g., Alexandra Marks, For Prisoners, It's a Nearly No-Parole World, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, July 10, 2001, at 1 (noting that many states have restricted parole and that
thirteen states plus federal government have abolished parole, and describing this trend as
"the latest chapter in what some criminal-justice experts call the 'Willie Horton' effect," or
"a fear of releasing anyone because the parole board-and the politicians who appoint
them-get blamed if anything goes wrong").
111 See COMM. ON UNIF. CRIME RECORDS, INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTING: A COMPLETE MANUAL FOR POLICE 17 (1929) (explaining that accu-
rate crime statistics are necessary because "[i]n the absence of data on the subject, irre-
sponsible parties have often manufactured so-called 'crime waves' out of whole cloth, to
the discredit of police departments and the confusion of the public").
112 E.g., Alan Farnham, US Suburbs Are Under Siege, FORTUNE, Dec. 28, 1992, at 42
(reporting heightened fear in suburbia over increases in carjacking and other violent
crimes); Bruce Frankel & Dennis Cauchon, 'Young & The Restless': Crime in 1992 More
Violent, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 1992, at 7A (reporting increases in carjacking and other
violent crimes); Don Terry, Carjacking: New Name for Old Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1992, at A18 (reporting apparent increase in carjacking); see Stuntz, supra note 92, at 531
& n.108 (describing carjacking as new threat in popular mind).
113 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972).
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There was little hard evidence of the size of the problem, but these
concerns resonated with voters. Thus, many states, as well as the fed-
eral government, created sentencing commissions and procedures to
make sentencing more uniform and predictable.
11 4
Step Three: Insiders' Procedural Discretion Undercuts Reforms
The result of this sporadic public oversight may be new substan-
tive crimes and penalties, pressure for increased enforcement, or a
sentencing commission. The public's attention then fades, and
insiders finish drafting, implementing, and administering these new
rules. Sometimes, they implement the rules faithfully. 115 Often, how-
ever, instead of simply being constrained by them, insiders use their
procedural knowledge or power to shape and implement these rules in
unexpected ways.
116
Some police departments, for example, tout their declining crime
statistics and even use incentive pay to reward officers for reducing
crime. In response, some police officers exaggerate their performance
by misreporting burglaries as larcenies or as lower-value burglaries.11 7
To give another example of how insiders use procedure, the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines tried to reduce unwarranted sentence dis-
parity and raised penalties for some kinds of crimes.118 They also
specified fixed discounts for acceptance of responsibility as almost the
114 For a thorough account of the sentencing-reform movement at the federal level, cul-
minating in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see KATE STITH & Josp A. CABRANES,
FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 29-77 (1998). At
least eighteen states plus the District of Columbia and the federal government use sen-
tencing guidelines, and a number of other states are considering enacting them. Richard S.
Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1195 (2005).
115 1 am aware of no evidence, for example, that insiders have subverted sex-offender
registries by charge-bargaining away child molestation charges. Child molesters are sub-
jects of particular public concern, and few prosecutors or judges would want or dare to go
easy on them to clear their dockets. The same is probably true of the most serious crimes
of all, notably, clear cases of murder. See Stuntz, supra note 90, at 2563 (claiming that
prosecutors pursue almost every murder case because voters "surely won't forgive blowing
off a homicide").
116 Cf. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND
WHY THEY Do IT 31-110 (1989) (discussing how workloads, peer expectations, bureau-
crats' own beliefs, interest-group pressures, and organizational culture all influence
bureaucrats' behavior, and providing examples of counterintuitive regulatory behaviors
that result, some of which seem contrary to agency's ostensible mission).
117 See LIPSKY, supra note 8, at 167, 233 n.10 (citing Washington, D.C. police as
example).
118 For an exposition of the legislative history leading up to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, see generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223
(1993).
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only permissible reward for guilty pleas in most cases.' 19 Some defen-
dants, however, are reluctant to plead guilty and accept long
sentences, so insiders find additional discounts to induce pleas. Prose-
cutors and defense counsel agree to conceal or not disclose aggra-
vating facts to sentencing judges.120 They use cooperation agreements
to get around guidelines, even in cases where the proposed coopera-
tion is marginally useful or a fig leaf for a sentence reduction.121 Pros-
ecutors create new fast-track departures to plead out large volumes of
immigration and drug cases leniently in exchange for waivers of dis-
covery and other rights. 122 Some judges use downward departures to
undercut sentences they think are too harsh.123 At the same time, by
hinting that departures are likely or accepting plea agreements that
119 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2003). The Supreme Court
has recently struck down the Federal Guidelines' binding force, rendering them advisory.
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-65 (2005) (Breyer, J., remedial majority
opinion). Despite Booker, many sentencing judges still give "heavy weight" to the Guide-
lines and state that they intend to sentence within them "in all but the most exceptional
cases." E.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925 (D. Utah 2005).
120 See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical
Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 501, 522, 547 (1992) (discussing cases of fact bargaining); Probation Officers
Advisory Group, Probation Officers' Advisory Group Survey, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 305,
306, 310-11 (1996) (citing, as evidence of fact bargaining, federal probation officers' survey
responses that indicate that plea agreements frequently omit or misrepresent relevant
facts).
121 See Jeffrey T. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Four
U.S. District Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255,
263-65, 264 tbl.1 (2005) (reporting that at least one federal prosecutor's office uses "soft"
cooperation discounts for "information of questionable value" as tool for reducing stiff
sentences).
122 See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 137, 145-46 (2005) (discussing this practice in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and
Texas).
123 For one judge's remarkably candid admission of this fact, see Jack B. Weinstein,
Comment, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 357, 364-65 (1992) ("[T]he Guidelines... have made charlatans and dissem-
blers of us all. We spend our time plotting and scheming, bending and twisting, distorting
and ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result.") (alterations in original) (quoting
Questionnaire Survey from Judge Jack B. Weinstein to Eastern and Southern Districts of
New York Judges (Feb. 24, 1992) (unpublished)). Judge Weinstein has also noted:
One would think that most Americans, judges and legislators, as well as mem-
bers of the Sentencing Commission would be embarrassed by this implacable
urge to incarcerate and by the overwhelming desire to ignore the good that
people have done and probably will do. Fortunately, court interpretations of
the guidelines are not always so unyielding. Judges must continue to assume
their individual responsibility of exercising the discretion to depart if sen-
tencing is to approach the levels of fairness and economy that is required of
our criminal justice system.
Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 6, 9 (1992).
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provide for them, judges can induce quick pleas and clear their
dockets.
Because insiders apply the rules unevenly, the result is renewed
sentencing disparity as women, whites, citizens, the well-to-do, and the
educated receive lighter sentences. 124 In short, expert insiders learn
the complexities of sentencing reforms and exploit their inside knowl-
edge and procedural discretion. They pursue their own sense of jus-
tice and their self-interests in fast, certain dispositions, at the expense
of the reforms' goals of severity and equal treatment.
Step Four: Outsiders, Egged On by Politicians, Take Matters into
Their Own Hands
Occasionally, outsiders hear about these maneuvers and react by
creating new, rigid rules in an effort to bind insiders or at least limit
their discretion. Sometimes these reactions result in procedural
restrictions on practices such as plea bargaining and sentencing depar-
tures. At other times, they give rise to substantive sentencing statutes,
such as three-strikes laws and mandatory minima, or new substantive
crimes.
When the public learns of charge bargaining, for example, it
expresses outrage at the sale of justice and the cheapening of crimes
and punishments. 125 Sometimes, politicians capitalize on and high-
124 See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE:
AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRAC-
TICE 31 exhibit 9, 34 exhibit 12 (1998) (presenting data of disparities between various
racial, sex, and citizen groups in § 5K1.1 departures); Stephen Demuth, The Effect of Citi-
zenship Status on Sentencing Outcomes in Drug Cases, 14 FED. SENT'G REP. 271, 273-74 &
tbl.2 (2002) (citing evidence that, on average, whites and citizens receive shorter sentences
than blacks and noncitizens respectively); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender
Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285,
311-12 (2001) (concluding that large differences in length of sentence exist on basis of race,
sex, education, income, and citizenship). Likewise, the victim's race appears to influence
how insiders exercise their discretion, and in particular what charges prosecutors choose to
file. Offenders who kill white victims, for example, are more likely to be charged with
capital crimes and sentenced to death than those who kill black victims. David C. Baldus
& George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment:
Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411, 1423-26
(2004); David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1659-60 (1998).
125 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 19, at 148-52 (presenting evidence that public disap-
proved of plea bargaining in nineteenth-century America); see also Laura B. Myers,
Bringing the Offender to Heel: Views of the Criminal Courts, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME
AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 46, 49, 54-55, 54 tbl.4.2 (Timothy J.
Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) (recounting surveys that found that public
opposes plea bargaining); Wright & Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note
48, at 96 (noting that charge bargaining disappoints public's expectations and creates
feeling of "learned helplessness").
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light an issue, such as downward departures from sentencing guide-
lines. They may, for example, please the public by blaming insider
judges and restricting downward departures, as exemplified by the
Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act.126 At the same time, pol-
iticians cater to prosecutors, a powerful insider constituency. 127 Thus,
the Feeney Amendment left most prosecutor-initiated departures
alone; approved of, but capped, fast-track departures; and gave prose-
cutors extra bargaining chips.128 In other words, Congress skillfully
catered to outsider outrage and insider interests simultaneously.
129
Legislatures do the same thing by passing mandatory-minimum
sentencing laws for drug trafficking, gun crimes, and other high-profile
crimes. 130 These laws satisfy outsiders' desire to bind judges and
clamp down on leniency while, in effect, giving insider prosecutors
more tools and charging options.
Occasionally, however, legislatures side with outsiders in
restricting prosecutorial discretion. In New York State, the 1973
Rockefeller drug laws greatly restricted prosecutors' ability to plea
bargain away mandatory drug sentences.' 3' Legislatures also restrict
police and prosecutorial leniency involving politically salient crimes.
In domestic abuse cases, for example, legislatures passed shall-arrest
and no-drop policies to change police and prosecutors' traditional
reluctance to arrest and willingness to drop charges. 132 Candidates for
126 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (2003) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.). The Feeney Amendment
restricted sentencing judges' ability to lower sentences unilaterally under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines. It did so by eliminating or restricting many permissible grounds for
downward departures, requiring prosecutorial assent to several downward adjustments,
and increasing appellate, executive, and legislative scrutiny of downward departures. See
generally Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of
Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004)
(explaining these and other provisions).
127 See Stuntz, supra note 92, at 529-33, 544-46 (noting that police and prosecutors are
most important interest groups for criminal legislation).
128 See Bibas, supra note 126, at 296, 299-301.
129 Cf. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy
Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 105, 125-28, 140 (2004) (arguing that Congress keeps
broadening corporate criminal liability to show public that it is doing something and to give
prosecutors tools with which to win convictions more easily, and that corporations actually
prefer this response to broadened civil liability).
130 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (prescribing mandatory five-year consecutive sen-
tence for anyone who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime"); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000 & Supp. II
2002) (prescribing five- and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences for trafficking in cer-
tain quantities of drugs).
131 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10 (McKinney 2006).
132 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.2901 (2005) (establishing "a pro-prosecution policy" and spe-
cial prosecutorial units for domestic abuse and empowering prosecutors to proceed even
over victim's objection); Wis. STAT. § 968.075 (2003-2004) (requiring police officers to
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office may also raise these issues by campaigning as outsiders against
the abuses of insiders. For example, in New Orleans, Harry Connick,
Sr. unseated District Attorney Jim Garrison by criticizing and prom-
ising to clamp down on rampant plea bargaining.
133
Outsiders sometimes take matters into their own hands and use
direct democracy to circumvent legislatures. In California, for
example, voters used a ballot initiative to pass a law generally banning
plea bargaining in cases whose indictments or informations charge
specified serious crimes.134 Also in California, voters put a tough
three-strikes-and-you're-out initiative on the ballot, mandating
twenty-five-year minimum sentences for three-time felons. 135 The leg-
islature had buried the bill in committee, but then twelve-year-old
Polly Klaas was kidnapped, molested, and murdered. In the wake of
this heinous crime, a total of 840,000 people signed petitions to put the
initiative on the ballot. Bowing to this pressure, the legislature passed
the law. 1
36
Many commentators criticize mandatory-sentencing laws as
expressing the public's bloodthirsty desire for ever more punishment.
Some denigrate these laws as no more than sound-bite sentencing slo-
gans. 137 These laws do express voters' concerns about the decay of
social and moral cohesion. 138 Yet there is another, more charitable
arrest domestic abusers whenever victim suffered physical injury or is likely to suffer con-
tinued abuse, requiring police to adopt written policies encouraging arrest in other
domestic abuse cases, and requiring police officers to explain in writing any decisions not
to arrest domestic abusers); see also Hanna, supra note 96, at 1859-64 (recounting move
toward mandatory-arrest and pro-prosecution policies for domestic violence cases).
133 See Wright & Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 48, at 60-61.
134 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 2004). See generally CANDACE McCoY, POLITCS
AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTiMS' RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (1993) (discussing enactment,
purposes, and scope of this initiative). An information is a charging instrument filed solely
by the prosecutor, whereas an indictment is a charging instrument returned by a grand
jury.
135 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (West 1999).
136 Richard Kelly Heft, Legislating with a Vengeance: Criminals in California Now Face
Life Sentences After Their Third Offence Under the 'Three Strikes, You're Out" Law, INDEP.
(London), Apr. 26, 1995, at 27.
137 See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Tough Crime Laws Are False Promises, 7 FED. SENT'G
REP. 61, 62 (1994) (arguing that such laws are "sound-bite crime control"); Symposium,
Juvenile Justice: Reform After One-Hundred Years, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1409, 1414-15
(2000) (citing Congressman Bobby Scott's remarks that people are more focused on
"tough-on-crime sound bites" like three-strikes-and-you're-out than on instituting mea-
sures that have been proven to reduce crime); see also Barkow, supra note 50, at 735
(describing public's views of these sentencing policies as lacking nuance, but not explicitly
criticizing public's approach).
138 Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, but Why?
The Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & Soc'y REV. 237,
254-55 (1997) (arguing that support for three-strikes law is linked primarily to judgments
about moral cohesion, not dangerousness).
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way to understand mandatory laws, particularly initiatives and refer-
enda. The public is frustrated by the criminal justice system. The
system seems opaque, tangled, insulated, and impervious to outside
scrutiny and change. Even though voters dislike plea bargaining and
revolving-door justice, it seems to happen all the time. Recidivists, in
particular, seem to be thumbing their noses at the law's authority and
getting away with it. t 39 The solution may seem to be bumper-sticker
policies, which are clear and simple enough that voters and prospec-
tive criminals can understand them.140 Clarity and simplicity help to
deter and to express condemnation, two prominent justifications for
punishment.141 And by tying insiders' hands, these policies promise to
produce greater consistency and to make monitoring easier. In short,
voters may try to turn flexible, discretionary standards and options
into firm rules in the hopes of binding insiders.
139 See Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Criminal Record, and the Sentencing Process,
39 Am. BEHAV. SCIENnST 488, 493 (1996) (suggesting that public support for recidivist
enhancements is due to perception that repeat offenders are flouting law and showing con-
tempt for criminal justice system).
140 Tom Tyler and Robert Boeckmann found that social values and fears about social
and moral cohesion are the dominant explanations for three dependent variables:
California's three-strikes law, the public's general punitiveness, and the public's willingness
to abandon criminal procedural protections. Tyler & Boeckmann, supra note 138, at
253-55. They also found significant, though smaller, correlations between judgments about
crime and the courts, the public's support for general punitive policies (including
mandatory sentencing), and the public's willingness to abandon criminal procedural pro-
tections (which includes discontent with courts' solicitude for defendants and technicalities
and courts' disregard for ordinary citizens' rights). See id. at 245, 252 tbl.2. Tyler and
Boeckmann speculated that the latter finding may rest on the public's judgment that cur-
rent criminal procedures are unfair. Id. at 259. They found only an insignificant
correlation between judgments about crime and the courts and support for California's
three-strikes law. Id. at 252. They also found strong and significant correlations among all
three dependent variables (between .40 and .68 Pearson correlation coefficients). Id. at
250 tbl.1. They did not, however, test the causal pathways among these variables because
they treated all three as dependent variables. See id. at 253-54. Frustration with and will-
ingness to abandon criminal procedures may thus partially explain California's three-
strikes law; Tyler and Boeckmann did not test this hypothesis.
141 See infra text accompanying note 168 (noting that criminal law tries to serve these
and other goals). But cf supra text accompanying note 82 (noting that outsiders care pri-
marily about retribution or just deserts). The need for clarity and simplicity is particularly
true for neophyte and potential defendants, as well as the public at large. Repeat-player
defendants may be less deterrable (as evidenced by their track record) and more knowl-
edgeable about the system, though bumper-sticker policies may have an impact even on
them. When I was a prosecutor, I recall hearing about conversations in jail that happened
shortly after arrest and before much consultation with lawyers. These defendants all
seemed to know that one co-defendant's status as a "three-time loser" meant that he would
go to prison for a very long time. Nevertheless, even recidivists frequently seemed to mis-
understand actual penalties.
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Step Five: Insiders Circumvent Even "Mandatory" Reforms
Outsiders may pass mandatory bumper-sticker laws, but insiders
still get to enforce them. Because monitoring remains imperfect and
agency costs exert their pull, insiders find new ways to turn rules back
into discretionary options or standards. Sometimes they create or
exploit inevitable wiggle room in statutes and discretionary proce-
dures; at other times they simply flout the law. Either way, insiders'
procedural powers trump, or at least soften, outsiders' substantive and
procedural strictures.
First, prosecutors do not always charge supposedly mandatory
crimes or penalties. Even under the mandatory California laws, pros-
ecutors can plea bargain by claiming that the evidence was insuffi-
cient.142 Also, despite the three-strikes law's ban on plea bargaining,
California judges and prosecutors can and do strike or dismiss felony
counts or downgrade them to misdemeanors. 143 In particular, prose-
cutors have discretion to charge certain "wobbler" offenses as either
misdemeanors or felonies. Only the latter charges trigger the three-
strikes law, so prosecutors offer plea bargains that charge misde-
meanors instead. 144 In other words, prosecutors turn three-strikes
strictures into tools, using them to extract tougher but still discounted
plea bargains. 145  One study tracked federal cases that initially
included 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) gun charges, which carry mandatory five-
year consecutive sentences. In more than half of the cases studied,
142 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)-(g) (West 1999) (banning plea bargaining or dismissal of
three-strikes allegations except for insufficiency of evidence or "in the furtherance of jus-
tice"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(a) (West 2004) (banning plea bargaining or dismissal of
serious crimes charged in indictments or informations except for insufficiency of evidence,
unavailability of material witnesses, or where bargains would make no substantial differ-
ence to sentences).
143 Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1,
24-25 (1998); Samara Marion, Justice by Geography? A Study of San Diego County's
Three Strikes Sentencing Practices from July-December 1996, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
29, 37 (1999).
144 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4) (West 1999) (allowing prosecutors discretion to
specify that crime is misdemeanor where that crime is punishable by imprisonment in state
jail or by fine or imprisonment in county jail); David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the
Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48
J.L. & ECON. 591, 604-09 (2005) (reporting empirical findings that after passage of
California's three-strikes law, prosecutors were significantly more likely to drop prior
strikes and pursue misdemeanors instead); Loren Gordon, Where to Commit a Crime If
You Can Only Spare a Few Days to Serve the Time: The Constitutionality of California's
Wobbler Statutes As Applied in the State Today, 33 Sw. U. L. REV. 497, 505-08 (2004)
(noting that California prosecutors have applied this law unevenly, creating regional sen-
tencing disparities).
145 See Marion, supra note 143, at 36; Joshua E. Bowers, Note, "The Integrity of the
Game Is Everything": The Problem of Geographic Disparity in Three Strikes, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1164, 1178 n.75 (2001).
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§ 924(c) charges were later dropped. 146 Prosecutors seemed to be
using these charge reductions to reward guilty pleas and to soften
tough sentences. 147 Another study found that in up to 40% of cases in
which mandatory minima for drug crimes would otherwise apply,
defendants pleaded guilty to lesser offenses. 148 Whites and women
were more likely than minorities and men to avoid minima this way. 149
Finally, while shall-arrest and no-drop policies may stiffen police and
prosecutors' spines, the policies leave enough discretion that in prac-
tice they are far from mandatory.150
Since dropping charges creates a record that is at least potentially
open to oversight by supervisors or others, insiders also engage in less
visible pre-charge bargaining. Before a grand jury indicts a case, the
insiders may agree to a plea to a lesser offense. For instance, defense
counsel may suggest a plea to using a telephone in the course of drug
trafficking instead of a substantive drug-trafficking offense. By doing
so, they cap the sentence at four years and avoid a minimum sentence
of five or ten years.151 Because the heavier charges are never filed,
supervisors and outsiders find it very difficult to detect the bargains.
Similarly, in the case of the California ban on plea bargaining indicted
cases, insiders evaded the ban by striking bargains before indict-
ment. 152 And New York prosecutors circumvented bargaining restric-
146 See Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes
Involving Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects for Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 41, 53-57 (2000).
147 See id. at 57-59; see also United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (D.
Utah 2004) (recounting that prosecutors offered to let defendant plead guilty to one
§ 924(c) gun charge, but, after defendant rejected plea bargain, they penalized him by
adding four more § 924(c) counts in superseding indictments).
148 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 66 tbl.10 (1991).
149 See id. at 77 tbl.19, 80 tbl.22.
150 See Hanna, supra note 96, at 1864 (noting that even jurisdictions that strictly man-
date victim participation leave prosecutors "broad discretion over whether to pursue
cases"); Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 854-55,
857 (1994) (noting that often, police do not arrest and prosecutors do not charge or
undercharge domestic abusers; also noting that while no-drop policies reduce dismissals
and case attrition, even no-drop jurisdictions dismiss 10% to 34% of cases).
151 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)-(B), 843(b), (d)(1) (2000 & Supp. II 2002)
(setting minimum sentences of five or ten years for drug trafficking, and setting maximum
sentence of only four years, fine, or both for use of communication facility); Bibas, supra
note 5, at 2484-85 (noting that knowledgeable defense lawyers often suggest plea to using
telephone before grand juries indict); see also Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise,
Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1121-22 (2001) (noting that "such [phone charges] are almost always
Guidelines-evading plea bargains").
152 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(a) (West 2004) (limiting plea-bargaining ban to "any
case in which the indictment or information charges" certain crimes); McCoy, supra note
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tions by offering misdemeanor pleas and allowing drug defendants to
avoid indictment.1
53
Finally, even after indictment, insiders undercut supposedly
mandatory sentences. The most popular way to do so is by using
cooperation agreements. Cooperating with police and prosecutors'
investigations unlocks otherwise mandatory sentencing laws, pro-
viding one of the few ways to avoid minimum sentences. 154 When
insiders are determined to strike bargains, sometimes they can enter
cooperation agreements despite thin evidence of cooperation.
155
Many judges gladly cooperate, using even flimsy cooperation motions
as an opportunity to reduce sentences. 156 Another way to undercut
sentencing guidelines is by plea agreement. In some jurisdictions, par-
ties can stipulate to particular sentences in plea agreements and so
evade mandatory guideline penalties.
157
The tale just told interweaves substantive and procedural maneu-
vers and dissatisfactions. Low-visibility procedures such as charge
bargaining and declination frustrate outsiders both because they seem
procedurally unfair or dishonest and because they seem to produce
134, at 37-38, 80-84, 90-95 (finding that California's ban apparently did not reduce plea
bargaining, because parties simply began bargaining over complaints filed in municipal
court, before any indictment or information was ever filed in superior court).
153 JOINT COMM. ON N.Y. DRUG LAW EVALUATION, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
N.Y., THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE
95 (1977).
154 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (authorizing imposition of sen-
tence below statutory minimum to reward substantial assistance in investigation or prose-
cution); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2003) (allowing departure below
federal guidelines if defendant provides substantial assistance in investigation or prosecu-
tion); ALA. CODE § 13A-12-232(b) (LexisNexis 2005) (authorizing court, on prosecutor's
motion, to reduce or suspend sentence for substantial assistance); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-
18-409 (2004) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(h)(5) (2005) (same, except not requiring
prosecutorial motion); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248.H2.5 (2005) (allowing courts to impose
minimum of forty years rather than life on methamphetamine traffickers who cooperate
substantially with authorities). Unlike the Federal Guidelines, mandatory minimum stat-
utes and state guidelines were not rendered advisory and nonbinding by the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-68 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
remedial majority opinion).
155 See Ulmer, supra note 121, at 263-65 (describing districts where defendants received
downward departures despite providing information of "questionable value").
156 See id. (describing liberal standard for providing substantial assistance and receiving
cooperation motions in certain districts); see also Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on
Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 123, at 7 (suggesting that
judges are happy to cooperate with prosecutors' motions for downward departures).
157 Though courts are split, a majority of federal courts let stipulated-sentence plea
agreements trump mandatory guideline provisions. See Bibas, supra note 126, at 305-06,
305 n.61.
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bad substantive outcomes. Outsiders respond by pushing for new pro-
cedures, such as shall-arrest laws, plea-bargaining bans, and sen-
tencing guidelines, as well as new substantive crimes and sentences.
Insiders then use their procedural powers to subvert these new proce-
dures and substantive penalties. The traditional curricular divorce of
substantive criminal law from criminal procedure, however, obscures
this interplay. 158 The moral of the story is that outsiders cannot win
enduring victories. Outsiders lack the knowledge, the power, and the
enduring desire to keep monitoring low-visibility procedural deci-
sions. Politicians and the media play entrepreneurial roles,159 periodi-
cally seizing on gripping (and sometimes unrepresentative) anecdotes
to excite popular outrage and pressure for their own ends. Politicians
simultaneously cater to insider prosecutors, playing both sides of the
insider-outsider gulf. This dynamic is a spiral. If the dynamic were a
simple circle, we would wind up right back where we started. But, as
the next Section explains, the spiral warps the system, taking a serious
toll on criminal justice.
B. The Costs of the Insider-Outsider Gulf and Spiral
We should not take too much solace in insiders' ability to soften
the worst excesses of outsiders' overreactions. The gulf and resulting
spiral waste prison resources by unduly lengthening some sentences.
They distract public and legislative attention from other criminal jus-
tice problems and reforms. The gulf and spiral give insiders vast
power to apply the new rules selectively to further their own interests
or biases. This unchecked discretion makes possible sentencing dis-
parities that disproportionately harm poor, male, and minority defen-
dants.160 Moreover, it is an ad hoc, low-visibility, low-accountability
way to shape policy in a democracy.
The gulf and spiral also have three other side effects. Subsection
1 discusses how they cloud the substantive criminal law's message and
efficacy. Subsection 2 explores how the gulf and spiral impair trust in
158 I have explored the artificial separation of criminal procedure from substantive crim-
inal law in greater detail elsewhere. See Bibas, supra note 54, at 1150-51, 1183, 1185;
Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure:
The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1362, 1389,
1408-11 (2003); Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 38, at 89-91, 95-96, 148.
159 See supra text accompanying notes 55, 111 (explaining how media fan public's fears
of crime); supra text accompanying notes 56, 109, 126 (explaining how politicians exacer-
bate and exploit public's fears of crime); cf Khanna, supra note 129, at 125-29 (discussing
how politicians play to both public and prosecutors in enacting corporate-crime
legislation).
160 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 81:911
TRANSPARENCY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
and the legitimacy of the law. Subsection 3 assesses how they obstruct
public preferences and monitoring of agency costs.
1. The Gulf Clouds the Law's Substantive Message and
Effectiveness
The traditional Benthamite view holds that criminals commit
crimes because they gain more pleasure than pain from them. On this
view, the purpose of the criminal law is to deter would-be criminals by
making the expected punishment for the crime exceed the expected
benefit. 161 Thus, the law must be clear and straightforward enough
that prospective criminals will understand the expected punish-
ment. 162 Criminal procedure's opacity and unpredictability undercut
this aim of the substantive criminal law. If the expected punishment is
unknown, it may not deter the potential or neophyte criminal. Even if
some recidivists know expected sentences, first- and second-time
offenders and potential offenders do not. This misunderstanding is
especially likely because criminals are over-optimistic and prone to
underestimate and take risks. As a result, in the face of criminal pro-
cedure's opacity and complexity, neophytes are likely to underesti-
mate expected sentences and to take chances on not being punished
heavily.1 6
3
Substantive criminal law also seeks to inculcate and reinforce
social and moral norms. By threatening and inflicting proportionate
punishment, the law proclaims the badness of the crime and vindicates
the victim's worth. 164 It can thus help to heal victims. The law also
expresses the community's condemnation and, by doing so, reaffirms
society's norms.165 For criminal punishment to communicate consist-
161 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 170 n.1, 179-80 (new ed. corrected by author, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1879)
(1789).
162 Bentham's desire to communicate a deterrent message helps to explain his obsession
with codification as a way of making the law rational and clear.
163 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2498-502, 2507-10. These and other problems impede
deterrence in the real world. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deter-
rence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91
GEO. L.J. 949, 953-56 (2003). See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does the
Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
173 (2004) (arguing that behavioral science data show that manipulating criminal law rules
will not normally increase deterrence because potential offenders do not know legal rules,
make irrational choices, or weigh costs and benefits in skewed manner).
164 See Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT: A
Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader 112, 116-21 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995); Jean
Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY 111, 124-32 (1988).
165 There are several variants of this idea. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive
Function of Punishment, in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSI-
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ently and effectively, criminal procedure must be transparent. Other-
wise, current and prospective criminals, victims, and the public do not
see justice done or hear the law's message.1 66 As Section I.C
explained, criminal justice is far from transparent to outsiders. In par-
ticular, over the last few centuries victims have lost their day in court
and do not see justice firsthand, so they feel frustrated and long for
vindication and healing. 167 In sum, criminal procedure's shortcomings
obstruct the substantive criminal law's goals of deterring, educating,
vindicating victims, and expressing condemnation. 168
In recent years, scholars and the public have shown renewed
interest in publicly shaming convicted criminals as a way of expressing
condemnation of crimes. 169 One point, however, often gets lost in the
shaming-punishment debate: Shaming punishments are expressively
satisfying precisely because the rest of criminal justice is so opaque.
While other punishments seem uncertain, cloaked in the fog of parole
and jargon, and hidden behind prison walls, shaming punishments
communicate brashly and unequivocally. They have clear meaning
BILITY 95, 101-04 (1970) (emphasizing that by condemning crimes, punishment authorita-
tively disavows those crimes, symbolically refuses to acquiesce in them, and vindicates
law); 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
81-82 (London, Macmillan 1883) (suggesting criminal law's ability to reinforce morality by
sealing its judgments and ratifying public's hatred of crimes); Jean Hampton, An Expres-
sive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 20-22 (Wesley Cragg ed.,
1992) (urging that primary justification for punishment is not to educate wrongdoer but to
defeat message implicit in crime and to right moral relationships). The most prominent
recent advocate of this view is Dan Kahan. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593, 597-601 (1996) (asserting that punishment
signifies seriousness of crime and society's moral condemnation of it).
166 See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1138-63 (2000)
(describing existence of unwritten code of enforcement and discussing how this secret law
harms trust, legitimacy, and perceptions of procedural justice). In addition, outsiders will
not respect the criminal law's message if they do not see the law as procedurally fair and
legitimate. See infra Part II.B.2.
167 See Bibas, supra note 158, at 1406-07.
168 See supra text accompanying note 141 (discussing how criminal law seeks to deter
and express condemnation). But cf supra text accompanying note 82 (noting that out-
siders care primarily about retribution or just deserts).
169 The leading proponent of shaming punishments is Dan Kahan. For Kahan's seminal
work in the area, see Kahan, supra note 165, at 635-37 (endorsing shaming penalties as
way of unambiguously expressing condemnation as alternative to imprisonment). Other
publications in this vein include Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L.
REV. 663, 698-701 (1999) (advocating use of shaming sanctions to change social meaning
and acceptability of date rape); Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate
Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 1001-02 (1999) (endorsing certain corporate shaming
penalties as ways to promote remediation, repair, and future compliance, while addressing
concern that more stigmatizing shaming penalties might degenerate into humiliating,
pointless spectacles); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811, 1812 (2001) (arguing that shaming sanctions have been and can be effective penalties
for corporations and their directors).
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and visible bite. 170 Perhaps one reason voters clamor for shaming
punishments is that they are almost the only ways that outsiders can
see justice being done. 171 If criminal procedure were not so opaque,
we might have less need and demand for such humiliating
punishments.1 72
2. The Gulf Impairs Legitimacy and Trust
People respect the law more when it is visibly fair and when they
have some voice or control over its procedures. Procedural fairness,
process control, and trust in insider's motives contribute greatly to the
criminal justice system's legitimacy. 173 Individual experiences with an
insider's procedural fairness and trustworthy motives spill over into
broader attitudes about the criminal justice system's legitimacy. As
Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo explain, "people generalize from their per-
sonal experiences with police officers and judges to form their broader
views about the law and about their community. '' 174 Increased legiti-
macy increases compliance with the law. Most citizens obey the law
not only because they fear punishment, but because the law seems fair
and therefore legitimate. 175 Conversely, perceived unfairness or lack
of trust can erode the system's legitimacy and compliance.
170 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 165, at 630-37.
171 Cf. James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1089-92 (1998) (condemning "shaming as a form of lynch justice" because it stirs
up and plays on mob passions).
172 For criticisms of shaming punishments as cruel and humiliating, see, for example,
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 82-83 (1993) (arguing that degrading
punishments deny those punished right to be treated as persons); Stephen P. Garvey, Can
Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CH1. L. REV. 733, 759 (1998) (asserting that "some
contemporary shaming penalties do cross-or come close to crossing-the line"); and Toni
M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1942-43
(1991) (noting that shaming's "assault on human dignity" outweighs its negligible practical
advantages).
173 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 75, at 106, 208, 215 ("Procedures are viewed as fairer
when they vest process control or voice in those affected by a decision."); TYLER, supra
note 75, at 94-108, 125-34, 146-47, 161-70, 178 (reporting study on effects of experience,
control, and normative attitudes on perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy); TOM
R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 101-38 (2002) (examining how legitimacy, trust in one's
community, and identification promote acceptance of legal decisions); cf ALBERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZA-
TIONS, AND STATES 77-78 (1970) (noting that people who feel they have voice in organiza-
tion tend to develop affection for and loyalty to it).
174 TYLER & Huo, supra note 173, at 136.
175 Empirical studies confirm this point. See id. at 101-22; LIND & TYLER, supra note
75, at 76-81; TYLER, supra note 75, at 161-70, 178; cf. Fred W. Friendly, On Judging the
Judges, in STATE COURTS: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE 70, 72 (Theodore J. Fetter ed.,
1978) ("[A] public that is cynical or ignorant about its laws is a lawless one.").
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Just as citizens must see the criminal law as procedurally fair, they
must also see substantive justice being done. When citizens see that
the law reaches substantively just outcomes, the law earns moral cred-
ibility that persuades citizens to obey the law in other cases.176 Con-
versely, when the law reaches outcomes that are substantively unjust,
or at least not visibly just, citizens view the law's judgments as less
credible and less worthy of respect. 177 The likely result, as Janice
Nadler's empirical work suggests, is decreased respect for and compli-
ance with the criminal law.'
7 8
At one time, public jury trials not only educated ordinary citizens
and let them see and influence justice being done, but they also con-
tributed to the law's democratic legitimacy.179 Yet today, now that
jury trials are uncommon, outsiders seldom see, understand, or par-
ticipate in criminal justice. The system is too opaque and remote to
educate them well. Outsiders lack much of a voice, a stake, or a sense
of inclusion. Moreover, many criminal-justice decisions result from
secret or low-visibility exercises of discretion and are not constrained
by rules or standards.180 Citizens see very little of the system's work-
ings, except when politicians or the media expose some outrageous
anecdote. Secrecy and opacity weaken citizens' trust in the law181 and
may also make them feel distant and alienated. Secrecy and opacity
also mean that citizens do not see run-of-the-mill, substantively just
results. Instead, they see only the aberrantly harsh or lenient
sentences that the media or politicians highlight. These visible injus-
tices undermine the law's substantive moral credibility.
176 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,
474, 477 (1997).
177 Id. at 483-85, 488.
178 Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1410-26 (2005) (finding that
survey subjects who read stories of unjust laws were later more willing to violate unrelated
laws, and that survey subjects who read accounts of unjust criminal outcome were later
more willing to nullify law as jurors in unrelated criminal case); see also Robinson &
Darley, supra note 176, at 457, 485 (arguing that citizens are more willing to defer to and
respect law if they believe law is accurate guide to moral behavior and that, conversely,
public is much less likely to comply if it views law as unjust).
179 See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 17, at 270-76 (remarking that juries put "real control
of [legal] affairs into the hands of the ruled"); Amar, supra note 15, at 1183-89 (noting
roles of juries as populist protectors, as pupils, and as political participants); supra Part L.A
(discussing public, democratic, populist, and participatory character of colonial American
justice).
180 See supra note 1 (noting that overwhelming majority of criminal cases that are not
dismissed end in guilty or no-contest pleas).
181 For a powerful argument to this effect in the context of police and prosecutorial
discretion, see Luna, supra note 166, at 1156-63. See also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 95-101 (1996) (explaining that publicity of
information and government officials' reasons for actions not only "help[s to] sustain a
sense of legitimacy," but also promotes democratic deliberation).
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 81:911
TRANSPARENCY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Perhaps because of these factors, nearly three-quarters of
Americans lack much confidence and trust in the criminal justice
system.' 82 Two-thirds of Americans see plea bargaining, the most
opaque and insider-dominated part of the system, as problematic.
183
Victims have similar reactions. Victims in states with weak victims'
rights laws are much less likely to receive notice or participate mean-
ingfully in various stages of the criminal process. 18 4 Thus, they are
more likely to come away dissatisfied and doubt the criminal justice
system's fairness and thoroughness.' 8 5 In short, criminal procedure's
failings may undermine the criminal justice system's legitimacy and
efficacy.
3. The Gulf Impairs Public Preferences and Monitoring
Another reason for the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of public
jury trials was to make criminal justice "fundamentally populist and
majoritarian. '' 186 In a related vein, grand juries used to publicize
prosecutorial declinations and other hidden executive actions, which
increased accountability and checked agency costs. 1 87 These proce-
dures used transparency and participation to keep criminal justice in
line with the public's sense of justice. Now that juries are an endan-
gered species, however, criminal justice is more opaque and domi-
nated by insiders. These barriers obstruct outsiders' ability to monitor
insiders and to influence them. Insiders now have more room to
indulge their self-interests in lenient, hurried dispositions. As a result,
agency costs warp processes and substantive outcomes, causing them
to diverge at times from the public's sense of justice.
Without jury participation, outsiders can intervene only crudely.
Citizens and victims cannot influence individual cases. At best, they
182 See Lydia Saad, Military Again Tops "Confidence in Institutions" List, GALLUP POLL
NEWS SERV., June 1, 2005, available at http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=16555
(subscription required) (reporting an eight-point decline, from 34% to 26%, in public con-
fidence in criminal justice). Of the fifteen institutions mentioned in the survey, only four
ranked below the criminal justice system: organized labor, Congress, big business, and
health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Id.
183 See Myers, supra note 125, at 54-55 & tbl.4.2 (reporting that respondents over-
whelmingly opposed plea bargaining); Robert F. Rich & Robert J. Sampson, Public Per-
ceptions of Criminal Justice Policy: Does Victimization Make a Difference?, 5 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 109, 114 (1990) (reporting that majority of public simply does not like plea
bargaining).
184 NAT'L VICTIM CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT ON CRIME VICTIMS
31-38 (1996).
185 Id. at 43-46, 51-63.
186 Amar, supra note 15, at 1185.
187 Id. at 1184.
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can paint with a broad brush by voting and influencing legislatures.
At worst, they must resort to ballot initiatives, such as three-strikes
laws and mandatory minima, because they have lost faith in insiders
and lack subtler tools. What should have been a cooperative relation-
ship has degenerated into a competitive one, as outsiders wield these
sledgehammers and insiders feel it necessary to evade these crude
blows.
III
PARTIAL SOLUTIONS
One may be tempted to start reforming by empowering outsiders
to help write a new set of laws and rules to check insiders. As Part
II.A has shown, that enterprise is doomed to failure. In practice,
insiders find ways to evade supposedly mandatory laws or twist them
into plea-bargaining chips. Rather, to monitor and check insiders, we
must better inform outsiders and provide more ways for them to par-
ticipate day-to-day.
A transparent, participatory solution should pursue two goals.
First, it should strive to reduce the negative procedural side effects of
our secretive criminal process. These include outsider cynicism, frus-
tration, and loss of faith and trust. Second, it should use transparency,
participation, and monitoring to achieve better substantive outcomes.
A more transparent and participatory system would better heal and
vindicate victims and encourage more of them to come forward. It
would reduce agency costs and reduce reliance on bumper-sticker pol-
icies. And it could align arrest, charging, plea, and sentencing patterns
more closely with public preferences.
A note of pessimism is in order. We are not about to abandon
the twenty-first-century world of guilty pleas and return to the eight-
eenth century anytime soon. Nor can better information return us all
the way back to the small eighteenth-century villages where little
could remain hidden or private. As long as professionals run criminal
justice, there will be a significant gap of information, participation,
and desires between insiders and outsiders. Politicians and the media
will continue to exploit and exacerbate the gap, and sound-bite poli-
cymaking will continue to work. Nevertheless, reforms could at least
improve the current dismal state of affairs, creating more community
knowledge, involvement, and oversight.
My proposed solutions try to influence three primary groups:
1) victims, by giving them information and participatory rights;
2) other members of the public, by giving them information and par-
ticipatory rights; and 3) insider prosecutors, police, and judges, by
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using outsiders' information and participation to check insiders'
agency costs and perspective. The first two groups gain important
substantive as well as procedural benefits from transparency and par-
ticipation. 18 8 The latter group is in need of oversight to better align its
substantive policies with public preferences.18 9 There is good reason
for optimism about victims and pessimism about the public; the prog-
nosis for insiders is somewhere in between.
A. Informing and Empowering Victims
1. Victim Information
Informing victims about their cases should be relatively easy.
Victims are a discrete, identifiable group with whom police and often
prosecutors must make contact in any event. 190 As noted, while most
states have some form of victims' rights law on the books, enforce-
ment is uneven and many victims fail to receive notice.191 States
should redouble their efforts to provide victims with timely advance
notice of all key stages, from arrest, through charging, to plea and
sentence. A dedicated official, such as a victim/witness coordinator,
could help to increase contact with victims and keep tabs on the pro-
gress of cases. With the advent of e-mail, notifying victims and defen-
dants is even easier. The district attorney's or clerk of the court's
computer system should e-mail victims automated updates every time
an arraignment, bail, plea, trial, or sentencing hearing is scheduled or
rescheduled, and again two days before the hearing. For victims or
defendants without e-mail access, an automated telephone reminder
system could do the same job. These communications should include
directions to the courthouse and courtroom, as well as contact tele-
phone numbers, to make it easier for victims to attend proceedings
and see justice done. E-mails after each hearing could summarize
what happened at each stage. These simple measures would increase
victim information, satisfaction, and healing. 92
2. Victim Participation
Empowering victims is a bit harder but still manageable. There
will always be some participation gap between insiders and victims
188 See supra Part II.B.1-2.
189 See supra Part II.B.3.
190 My claim is most true of direct victims of personal and property crimes. Many others
suffer indirectly from these and drug crimes, and these broader gioups are harder to iden-
tify and track down.
191 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
192 Cf supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (discussing how gulf between insiders
and outsiders obstructs substantive goals of victim vindication, healing, and catharsis).
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because victims will not supplant prosecutors. As long as victims are
not in charge, police, prosecutors, and judges will make some deci-
sions that upset them. But even though the "victims' desire is to be
included in the criminal justice process, they have no desire to take
control .. of the case. '193 Interestingly, most victims are not angry
and vengeful, and many do not demand harsher punishments. 194 It is
simple participation that helps to empower and heal victims. 195 Par-
ticipants see the law as more fair and legitimate when they have some
control over the process and feel they have been heard, whether or
not they control ultimate outcomes.' 96 A participatory role and fair
and respectful treatment would go a long way toward addressing vic-
tims' grievances, regardless of the outcomes. 197 Thus, criminal justice
can make victims better off by better informing and including them.
The same is probably true of crime bystanders and locals who live
near the crime scene, though it would be logistically harder to identify
and include a representative sample.
There are many ways to increase victims' participation. As
Richard Bierschbach and I have argued elsewhere, victim-offender
mediation makes both parties better off when both are willing to take
part.198 Victims who participate in mediation are more likely to
believe that the system is fair, that their cases were handled satisfacto-
rily, that they were able to tell their stories, that the outcome was
satisfactory, and that the offender was held accountable. 99 They are
also more likely to receive apologies and to forgive, and they are less
likely to fear revictimization or stay upset.
200
Victims could participate in other ways as well. At a minimum,
they could allocute orally at sentencing, instead of simply submitting
perfunctory written victim-impact statements. They could also speak
with, question, and respond to defendants and lawyers at trials and at
193 WEMMERS, supra note 46, at 208.
194 Strang & Sherman, supra note 46, at 18.
195 Id. at 21.
196 LIND & TYLER, supra note 75, at 106, 206-11, 215; TYLER, supra note 75, at 125-34;
Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning
of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 75-80 (1985).
197 Strang & Sherman, supra note 46, at 18.
198 Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 38, at 131-34. This process goes by many names
and variants, including circle sentencing, family group conferences, and community repara-
tive boards, all under the umbrella of restorative justice. See Bazemore & Umbreit, supra
note 12, at 1-13 (describing and contrasting standard victim-offender mediation, commu-
nity reparative boards, family group conferences, and circle sentencing).
199 Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psycholog-
ical Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 178-84, 179 tbl.1, 180 fig.i,
181 tbl.2, 182 fig.2, 183 tbl.3, 184 fig.3, 187, 188 tbl.6, 189 fig.6, 191, 193 tbl.9 & fig.9 (meta-
analysis of up to six empirical studies of victims).
200 Id. at 189-91, 190 tbl.7, 191 fig.7, 195-98, 196 tbl.11 & fig.li, 197 tbl.12, 198 fig.12.
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 81:911
TRANSPARENCY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
plea and sentencing hearings. 201 Prosecutors could be required to
consult with victims before dropping charges, entering into plea bar-
gains, or recommending sentences. These and other forms of partici-
pation would speed victims' emotional healing and combat their
feelings of powerlessness and alienation.
202
B. Increasing Public Information and Participation
1. Public Information
As Part I.C explained, though outsiders think they understand
criminal justice, they actually suffer from poor and misleading infor-
mation. To remedy this problem, the government could publicize
accurate statistics about average sentences and average time actually
served for murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, robbery, assault,
arson, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. Arrest statistics could indi-
cate the percentage of reported crimes in each category that result in
arrests and the percentage that result in convictions for that crime.
Statistics could also report the percentage of arrests that result in
charges and the percentage of charges that result in charge reductions,
acquittals, or dismissals. Each of these statistics could be broken
down by prosecutorial or police district. These statistics would not
cost much more to compile than those already compiled by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics.
A little clear, simple, and accurate information could go a long
way. As I have noted, citizens call for tougher sentencing laws
because they systematically underestimate average nominal
sentences. 20 3 Correcting that misimpression alone would greatly allay
the downward spiral. Moreover, what little information is out there is
sometimes misleading. As mentioned earlier, conviction rates mislead
the public by concealing charge reductions.204 Few good sentencing
statistics are published, let alone publicized. 20 5 The best way to
counteract misleading information is with more and better informa-
tion. Statistics on charge reductions and dismissals would round out
the picture, showing that prosecutors may bring many marginal cases
but then bargain them away leniently.
201 Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 38, at 139.
202 Id. at 138; Strang & Sherman, supra note 46, at 21.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
204 See supra text accompanying note 106.
205 See Alschuler, supra note 37, at 107. While it would take some work to turn the
archived raw data into usable, digestible statistics, the Bureau of Justice Statistics or aca-
demic researchers could perform this task if given adequate access to data under confiden-
tiality agreements.
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Disseminating this information is an effort to approximate the vil-
lages of two centuries ago, when everyone would have known and
seen the crimes, charges, verdicts, and punishments. Unfortunately,
spreading better information among the general public is not easy to
do. Insiders have vested interests in avoiding this scrutiny, and they
may overreact in trying to shield themselves from criticism. As noted
earlier, insiders may misreport data or distort statistics to paint rosy
pictures of their own performance. 20 6 Also, providing more informa-
tion may simply reinforce preexisting biases, allowing people to recall
selectively those facts that fit their ideas.
20 7
Finally, it can be difficult to publicize the facts in our cacopho-
nous society. The public tends to react to television sound bites. The
media and politicians have every incentive to play to this tendency,
emphasizing gripping stories at the expense of dull statistics and poli-
cies. Vivid and troubling stories sell newspapers, attract viewers, and
win votes. The availability heuristic causes people to overgeneralize
from salient and memorable anecdotes. 208 Conversely, people give
too little weight to abstract statistical information. 20 9 What the public
really needs to see are not statistics, but flesh-and-blood typical defen-
dants facing typical sentences. In our nonparticipatory system, how-
ever, that is not likely to happen.
Electoral candidates can do much of the work of bringing statis-
tics to voters' attention. In the status quo, incumbent district attor-
neys simply brag about astronomical conviction rates or cherry-pick
juicy anecdotes. If, however, government offices published more good
data, challengers could stress high rates of charge reductions and
deflated sentences in their campaign advertisements. As noted ear-
lier, data gathering in New Orleans has gone hand-in-hand with this
kind of change in district attorney election rhetoric, and voters there
have taken note.210 Better statistics would help electoral rivals to fight
statistics with statistics, painting a somewhat more balanced picture.
206 See supra text accompanying note 117.
207 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2498 & n.136, 2522.
208 See, e.g., Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (noting that "salience bias" makes distinctive stimuli more
available and thus disproportionately influential on judgments).
209 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note
208, at 3, 4 (describing example of representativeness heuristic, which causes people to
over-rely on details of one particular case and undervalue other overarching statistical
probabilities).
210 See Wright & Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 48, at 60-61,
113-16; see supra text accompanying note 133.
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The prognosis, however, is not bright, since anecdotes still tend to
trump dry statistics.
Other, more limited reforms are more likely to succeed. For
example, some types of plea bargaining are particularly opaque. As
Wright and Miller argue, charge bargaining and fact bargaining are
more opaque and dishonest than trials, pleas without agreements, and
sentence bargains. 211 Charge and fact bargains lie about the crime
that actually happened and the facts surrounding it, breeding public
cynicism. Historically, prosecutors have discouraged sentence bar-
gaining more than charge bargaining, but this focus is backwards. 212
Though plea bargaining will persist for the foreseeable future, judges
and head prosecutors can at least clamp down on charge and fact bar-
gaining. Turning these bargains into sentence bargains or open pleas
will make them more honest, transparent, and accessible to public
scrutiny.2 13 The public may thus regain some faith in the criminal jus-
tice system and view its message as more legitimate and worthy of
obedience.2
14
One might also consider publishing prosecutors' procedural and
substantive policies governing plea bargaining and sentencing. 21 5 A
few prosecutors' offices have already done so. 216 Repeat defense
counsel already know the going rates for particular crimes. 217 Pro-
viding this information would level the playing field for novice
defense counsel, help inform the public, and discipline prosecutors.218
Because certainty of punishment is a greater factor than severity in
deterring criminals, 219 plea and sentencing policies would not
211 Wright & Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 48, at 111-13.
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 Cf. supra Part II.B.1-2 (cataloguing substantive and procedural harms caused by
criminal procedure's opacity, including muting of law's expressive message and dampening
of its perceived legitimacy).
215 Because the point of publication is to provide information rather than legal rights,
the policies would not need to be enforceable, thus avoiding collateral litigation.
216 See, e.g., Richard H. Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District
Attorney's Office, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 48 (1975) (publishing internal memorandum from
New York County District Attorney's Office on plea-bargaining guidelines); Richard H.
Kuh, Sentencing: Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, 11 CRIM. L.
BULL. 62 (1975) (same for sentencing); Mario Merola, Modern Prosecutorial Techniques,
16 CRIM. L. BULL. 232, 237-40, 251-58 (1980) (publishing some details of Bronx County
District Attorney's Office's internal screening and plea-bargaining procedures).
217 See JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S PER-
SPECTIVE 108 (1972); HEUMANN, supra note 30, at 76-78, 90.
218 As noted earlier in this subsection, abstract policies and data are unlikely to carry the
weight with the public that interaction with a flesh-and-blood defendant would.
219 See Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297,
307-08 (1991); Ann Dryden Witte, Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Indi-
vidual Data, 94 Q.J. ECON. 57, 79 (1980).
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encourage prospective criminals much. If anything, clearer informa-
tion would reduce the room for potential criminals to optimistically
underestimate their likely sentences and so gamble on going to
trial. 220 Besides, recidivist offenders may know the going rates
anyway.
One might fear that publishing substantive sentencing policies
and statistics could backfire, because the public might conclude that
penalties need to be stiffer. If the public is innately and unalterably
hostile to criminal defendants, then bringing any information to its
attention might lead to more pressure to raise sentences. This poten-
tial knee-jerk response is an artifact of the spiral, however, not an
unalterable fact. The public calls for raising sentences because it sys-
tematically underestimates actual average penalties.2 21 The average
voter, if fully informed, would think that penalties are high enough
and that raising them further would be costly and pointless.222 One
cannot be certain, but transparency might refocus voters away from
raising overall sentences and toward scrutinizing prosecutors' dispa-
rate plea-bargaining practices. Moreover, in a democracy voters have
the right to know about and influence these issues. Regardless of
their own policy preferences, insider elites owe it to voters to try to
work with and inform them instead of keeping them in the dark.
Transparency could also illuminate policing. As Erik Luna has
argued, public administrative rulemaking could develop rules or stan-
dards to guide the use of force, vice enforcement patterns, and other
practices. 223 Collaborative, open decisionmaking, such as some com-
munity-policing methods, can reflect neighborhood priorities and
accommodate outsiders' concerns. 224 More open community review
boards could restore public trust in the police. 225 Videotaping police
interrogations and searches, as well as mandatory record-keeping,
could improve monitoring and credibility.226 Sharing crime maps with
the community could facilitate reciprocal sharing of information.
Information sharing also helps to explain police resource allocation
220 Cf Bibas, supra note 5, at 2498, 2500 (explaining that most people are systematically
overoptimistic and that sentencing guidelines reduce likelihood of overoptimistic forecasts
of sentences).
221 See supra text accompanying notes 63-71.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 63-71.
223 Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515,
598-622 (2000).
224 Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183,
207-11 (2003). In addition, better police recruitment, training, performance standards,
oversight, and discipline can likewise help check police actions that might breed antago-
nism and mistrust. Id. at 211-17.
225 Luna, supra note 166, at 1167-69.
226 Id. at 1169-70.
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decisions to minority neighborhoods and lets neighborhoods respond
with their concerns. This increased transparency may help allay
minority fears that police targeting decisions are racially biased.
227
In summary, public information about policing and prosecution
are unlikely to work wonders at the federal and state levels. Statistics
are too dry, and unrepresentative anecdotes are too prevalent in
media accounts, to bode well for better public understanding overall.
But, at the neighborhood level, transparency may well help local
residents and local police to understand and perhaps trust each other
better. As a result, the substantive criminal law might communicate
its message more effectively and command more respect and
obedience. 228
2. Public Participation
Perhaps members of the general public could participate more
actively as well. Though they rarely serve on petit juries, we could
create plea juries and sentencing juries to review pleas and sentences
in the most serious cases. 229 Perhaps more realistically, citizens could
serve for two weeks at a time as citizen advocates within prosecutors'
offices, consulting on proposed felony charges and dispositions.
230
This rotation would ensure widespread lay participation and reduce
jadedness, much as the Founders thought juries an important way to
rotate citizens through government service. 231 These citizens would
need to swear to secrecy, just as grand jurors must swear to secrecy.
Citizens would doubtless grumble about this service, just as they
grumble about and try to avoid jury duty. But just as jurors often
come away impressed with the system, 232 these citizens would learn
from their experiences and might develop more respect for it. As
227 Id. at 1177-78, 1192-93. For a thoughtful assessment of this participatory trend in
the policing literature, see generally David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103
MICH. L. REv. 1699 (2005).
228 Cf. Part II.B.1-2 (cataloguing these defects in status quo and attributing them in part
to criminal justice system's opacity).
229 These juries, comprising a dozen or so citizens, could scrutinize and provide input on
every proposed plea or sentence over the course of one or two weeks, though they would
not have veto power. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 38, at 141, 144 (suggesting that
plea and sentencing juries could assess defendants' remorse and apologies); Jason
Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 801, 874-78 (2003) (proposing plea
panels that would investigate voluntariness and fairness of proposed plea bargains).
230 Some citizen advocates would review every incoming case and provide input on
which criminal charges to file, while others would review and provide input on proposed
plea agreements and sentences. They would not have veto power over these decisions.
231 See Amar, supra note 15, at 1188-89.
232 See, e.g., Juror Evaluation Forms, supra note 53 (describing jury service as "an
enlightening and humbling experience" that "increased respect for our judicial system"
and educated and informed jurors).
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noted earlier, giving citizens a voice in criminal justice procedures can
increase the system's legitimacy and respect in their eyes.2 33 Citizens
would also get to see the law at work ex post in individual cases. As a
result, they might better appreciate charging and sentencing variations
than they would have when considering hypothetical or atypical cases
ex ante.
Outsiders could also consult with police about proposed commu-
nity-policing tactics and priorities. These tactics may include curfews,
gang-loitering laws, antinuisance injunctions, and order-maintenance
policing. As Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan have argued, these
approaches are more democratically legitimate when adopted in con-
sultation with community members.2 34 This consultation and legiti-
macy may help reassure members of minority groups, who have
historically distrusted law enforcement. In addition, police tactics are
far more likely to succeed with community support.
235
Unfortunately, many of these proposals would be difficult to
implement on a large scale. Now that grand and petit juries are rari-
ties, it is hard to re-create their role effectively. Plea and sentencing
juries would likely prove too cumbersome to replicate widely in our
efficiency-obsessed, assembly-line system.2 36 Citizen advocates who
rotated through police and prosecutors' offices and courts for a few
weeks would probably lack enough expertise and knowledge of cases
to serve as effective voices.
In addition, twenty-first-century society is much larger, more
anonymous, and more dispersed than eighteenth-century villages
were. No more than a small percentage of citizens would rotate
through these positions or consult with police departments in any
given year. Suburbs are so insular and far-flung that many residents
do not even know their neighbors, let alone gossip with them about
their quasi-jury service. Thus, it would not be easy to diffuse the
Tocquevillean educative benefits of jury service through more than a
small fraction of the populace. Only a minority of voters would see
particular cases up close and ex post. As a result, most voters would
remain amenable to politicians' anticrime appeals and ex ante refer-
enda such as three-strikes laws. The prognosis for major improve-
ments in public information and participation, in short, is not great.
Meaningful reform would be difficult, but not impossible.
233 See supra Part II.B.2.
234 See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis in Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1153-54 (1998).
235 See id. at 1163-64 (noting that community policing can reinforce community struc-
tures and so discourage crime).
236 See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 38, at 141 n.280.
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C. Checking Agency Costs and Insiders' Behavior
The previous two subsections discussed the benefits of informa-
tion and participation for outsiders. Information and participation
simultaneously help to check insiders' self-interests, agency costs, and
pragmatic perspectives and preferences.237 Victims, rotating citizen
advocates, or plea and sentencing juries would serve many of the func-
tions that grand and petit juries once did, checking executive and judi-
cial conduct. They could review proposed enforcement priorities,
indictments, plea agreements, and sentence recommendations, just as
many police and prosecutorial supervisors do now. Police would have
to explain apparently discriminatory patterns of traffic stops, frisks,
and arrests. Prosecutors would have to explain to victims and citizens
why they needed to decline prosecution, drop particular charges,
strike charge bargains, or agree to low sentences. Judges would face
similar scrutiny.
I do not suggest that victims or ordinary citizens should receive
vetoes over these decisions.238 Simply giving them voices would force
insiders to reckon with outsiders' perspectives, needs, and desires.
Having to articulate reasons for decisions, even orally and briefly,
would discipline prosecutors, much as having to write reasoned opin-
ions disciplines judges. Faced with real, live victims or concerned citi-
zens, prosecutors might find it harder to indulge their risk aversion or
sloth. Likewise, judges might be more reluctant to rubber-stamp plea
agreements.
In practice, as the previous subsection explained, general public
participation is unlikely to check insiders' self-interests and jadedness
effectively. Lay judges in Germany, for example, routinely defer to
the professional judges with whom they sit and have almost no influ-
ence.239 Greater transparency and public information, however, is
more likely to discipline elected insiders. Even if they are uncertain
how many people are paying attention, insiders may fear that an elec-
toral opponent will seize on this information, swaying swing voters at
the next election. As a result, they would have reason to err on the
side of caution.
237 Cf. supra Part II.B.3 (discussing scope of these problems).
238 See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 38, at 139 n.274 (rejecting possibility of giving
victims veto power). But see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PRO-
TECTING ViTcrIMs' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 247-50 (1996) (suggesting that victims
should have rights to veto plea bargains and to question witnesses at trial).
239 See, e.g., Jenia lontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Com-
parative View, AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming Dec. 2006) (manuscript at 20, on file with the
New York University Law Review).
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One way to increase transparency and check insiders is to publish
arrest and charge-declination policies. This solution, however, is
problematic because much of the criminal law operates on an
"acoustic separation" between "conduct rules" and "decision
rules. ' 240 For example, the criminal law forbids all stealing, but in
practice police arrest and prosecutors prosecute only thieves who
steal, say, forty dollars or more. Outsiders tend to know only the con-
duct rules, but insiders know the decision rules as well.241 Publishing
these decision rules would increase police and prosecutorial accounta-
bility at the expense of encouraging crimes below the threshold.
Other charging policies, such as procedural protocols and limits
on adding and dropping charges, would be less susceptible to this cri-
tique. Policies that did not proclaim effective immunity for certain
crimes, but simply regulated procedures for pending cases, would be
less likely to undercut deterrence. For example, prosecutors could be
required to document and explain why they initially charged a case as
murder but later downgraded it to manslaughter. Transparent guide-
lines would better enable voters and the press to check prosecutors
and, in particular, opaque charge bargaining.242 Criminal code reform
could also make the definitions of crimes more transparent and so
facilitate voters' and legislators' oversight of charging.
243
Transparency could also improve policing. Many jurisdictions do
not even keep data on police shootings.244 Laws should require this
data collection, record-keeping, and publication, much as they cur-
rently do for traffic stops to expose racial profiling. 245 Citizen review
boards could then publicize these data and pressure errant police
departments to change.2 46 One could even create comparable citizen
review boards to oversee prosecutors' offices and publicize data. As
Bill Stuntz argues persuasively, these optimistic-sounding transparent
240 Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1984); see also Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex
Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1756-77, 1757 n.56 (2005) (analyzing use of
decision rules to prevent certain conduct rules from over-deterring).
241 Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2532-40 (1996) (applying Dan-Cohen's
terminology to describe public knowledge of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment criminal
procedure conduct rules and ignorance of corresponding decision rules).
242 Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1042-46 (2005).
243 See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 630-31 (2005) (out-
lining benefits of this approach).
244 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 826 (2006).
245 Id. at 828.
246 Id. at 827-28.
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solutions may actually work, just as disclosures effectively reduce
lending discrimination and pollution.247
Another possibility is to create administrative agencies to oversee
certain sectors of criminal justice. As Rachel Barkow has explained,
the politically insulated U.S. Sentencing Commission has been a
failure.248 Participatory state sentencing commissions, however, have
successfully regulated insider sentencing discretion by being respon-
sive to political interests and by disseminating sentencing informa-
tion.249 Perhaps similar agencies could regulate and make transparent
other insider decisions, such as diversion and police tactics.
250
The most potent disciplining force is likely to be victims. Victims,
and to a lesser extent affected locals, are a discrete, identifiable group
who already know about the crimes they have endured and are moti-
vated to take part. Because of their background knowledge, they do
not need to be brought up to speed, can speak with authority, and will
not automatically defer to insiders' assessments. They also have pal-
pable interests in the process and outcomes, which can counterbalance
insiders' own stakes and preferences. Precisely because they are not
repeat players, they can counteract the jading or mellowing that
affects insiders as well as insiders' emphasis on pragmatic concerns.
At the same time, victims and locals will see some practical constraints
and aggravating and mitigating factors ex post, helping them to under-
stand outcomes better. In short, insiders will have to address out-
siders' moralism, and outsiders will have to see insiders' ex post
perspective and pragmatism. Though they will not always see eye to
eye, the perspectives of the two sides may converge.
251
247 Id. at 828.
248 See Barkow, supra note 50, at 765-71 (describing U.S. Sentencing Commission's rel-
ative lack of influence over sentencing policy in face of congressional resistance).
249 See id. at 800-11 (showing that political connections and ability to provide useful
information give state sentencing commissions influence).
250 See supra note 223 and accompanying text (referring to Erik Luna's proposals for
using public administrative rulemaking to constrain police use of force and enforcement
patterns).
251 One might expect victims and affected locals to be imperfect proxies for the public
because they are supposedly more vengeful. Surprisingly, however, victims' views track
the general public's rather closely. As noted earlier, victims are far less vengeful than most
criminal justice professionals assume. See supra text accompanying note 194. "Victim
surveys have consistently revealed that victims are no more punitive than the general
public." Lucia Zedner, Victims, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 419,
443-44 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 2002). They may thus serve as reasonable proxies for the
public.
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Increasing information and participation would carry significant
costs. Giving victims and the public participatory rights, for example,
would cost time and money, could slow cases down, and would con-
strain prosecutors' flexibility252 New agencies or layers of supervisory
review would carry similar costs. Nevertheless, there is good reason
to believe that these costs are worth paying. As Part I.B explained,
insiders face strong temptations to serve their self-interests by
processing cases efficiently. But criminal justice is not simply an
assembly line that should maximize speed and quantity and minimize
cost, though those are important considerations. Just as society is
willing to bear some of the cost of accident victims' physical healing, it
should support and fund crime victims' emotional and psychological
healing through transparent, participatory criminal procedure. 253
These substantive goals are worth some sacrifice of procedural
efficiency.
CONCLUSION
The gulf between insiders and outsiders has grown out of the
professionalization of criminal justice over the last two to three centu-
ries. Understanding this helps us to make sense of many otherwise
puzzling or frustrating features of criminal justice. For example, it
explains why insiders still use Alford and nolo contendere pleas to
dispose of cases efficiently, even though outsiders may be deeply sus-
picious of them. 254 Pundits write about politicians' and the public's
vengefulness in passing three-strikes laws and mandatory minima.
255
252 Note that defendants' speedy trial rights would limit how much victims and the
public could slow down cases. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (establishing
four-part balancing test for determining violations of Sixth Amendment speedy trial right,
in which reason for delay is only one factor and must be balanced against length of delay,
defendant's assertion of right, and prejudice to defendant).
253 I have developed these themes at greater length elsewhere. Bibas, supra note 158, at
1388-89, 1408-11; Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 38, at 136-40, 145-48.
254 See Bibas, supra note 158, at 1375-81 (noting support for Alford and no-contest
pleas among defense counsel and ambivalence among prosecutors and judges); id. at
1386-88 (arguing that public views these pleas with suspicion). Defendants who plead nolo
contendere or no contest neither admit nor deny guilt but accept conviction and punish-
ment as if guilty. Id. at 1371. Defendants who enter Alford pleas affirmatively protest
their innocence while pleading guilty and accepting punishment. Id. at 1372.
255 E.g., David Shichor & Dale K. Secrest, Three Strikes as Public Policy: Future Impli-
cations, in THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: VENGEANCE AS PUBLIC POLICY 265, 275
(David Shichor & Dale K. Secrest eds., 1996); Keith C. Owens, Comment, California's
"Three Strikes" Debacle: A Volatile Mixture of Fear, Vengeance, and Demagoguery Will
Unravel the Criminal Justice System and Bring California to Its Knees, 25 Sw. U. L. REV.
129, 140-41 (1995).
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Scholars have criticized plea bargaining ad nauseam and called for
banning it. Unless one explores outsiders' frustrations and insiders'
incentives and circumvention methods, however, one cannot truly
appreciate these problems, let alone find realistic solutions to them.
This discussion also underscores the need to reform the structure
of criminal justice to improve democratic legitimacy, transparency,
popular participation, and monitoring of agency costs. As Rachel
Barkow has argued, criminal procedure has been too slow to incorpo-
rate these and other insights from political science, agency theory, and
administrative law.2 56 Simply passing a ban on plea bargaining, for
example, will probably do little lasting good because insiders evade
paper rules. A checks-and-balances approach to criminal justice is
likely to prove more effective in the long run.
Where do we go from here? The next logical target of scrutiny is
penology and the prison system. As Foucault notes, punishment used
to be a public spectacle but is now hidden away behind high prison
walls, accessible only to prison guards.2 57 This privacy seems more
humane than whipping and the stocks, as it spares prisoners public
humiliation. At the same time, it keeps the public from seeing justice
done. This hiddenness mutes criminal justice's expression of condem-
nation, and the only way to amplify this muted message seems to be to
keep raising the number of years. The public understands only dimly
who the average prisoner is, how effectively prison punishes and
deters, and how cost-effective it is to spend $23,000 per year on a
prison cell. As a result, voters may ratchet up sentences ex ante,
across the board, without appreciating the likely costs and benefits ex
post in particular cases. Dangerous criminals, such as violent and
serious drug felons, would need lengthy incapacitation under any
system. In a more transparent and participatory regime, however, the
public might prefer other punishments for many inmates who are less
dangerous. Transparency and participation could reshape the politics
of punishment and the search for alternative sanctions that are
shorter, more memorable, more expressively satisfying, and less
costly.
If outsiders have "eaten on the insane root, / That takes the
reason prisoner," it is not their fault.2 58 Outsiders call for ever-higher
penalties and rigid laws not because they are sadistic, but because our
criminal justice system is opaque, insular, and unresponsive. The bar-
256 See generally Barkow, supra note 50, at 717-21, 813-14.
257 See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 24, at 7-15, 32-74, 236-39 (tracing decline of
punishment's public character).
258 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act I, sc. 3. I am grateful to Brian Raimondo for
this passage, this sentence, and portions of the fifth sentence.
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riers to reform are formidable: Suburban anonymity, crime-saturated
media, and assembly-line efficiency separate us from the eighteenth-
century world of small villages. While we cannot return to the colo-
nial justice system, we can better incorporate its values of
transparency, participation, and accountability. Now that we have
moved from the jury box to the plea-bargaining table, we must find
other ways to include victims and ordinary citizens in our par-
ticipatory democracy. Otherwise, the spiral downward will continue
to erode the system's efficacy, fairness, and legitimacy.
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